^ 


^ 


^ 


A;»r>  ■  ^^ 


*?/*.  '•^ 


IMAGE  EVALUATION 
TEST  TARGET  (MT-3) 


1.0    ^1^  u^ 

U  B*   122 


I.I 


S!    U°    12.0 

u 

WMU 


IU& 


6" 


FholDgraphic 

Sdenoes 

Carparation 


^ 


¥i^ 


^-*^ 


as  VMBT  MAM  STMHT 

WIMTII,N.Y.  14«aO 

(71«)«79.4SM 


^^«!v^' 


^^^ 
^ 


CIHM/ICMH 

Microfiche 

Series. 


CIHM/ICMH 
Collection  de 
microfiches. 


Canaoian  Institute  for  Historical  MIcroraproductions  /  Institut  Canadian  da  microraproductions  historiquas 


Technical  and  Bibliographic  Notaa/Notas  tachniquaa  at  bibiiographiquaa 


Tha  inatituta  has  attamptad  to  obtain  tha  bast 
original  copy  available  for  filming.  Faaturas  of  this 
copy  which  may  be  bibliographicaiiy  unique, 
which  may  altar  any  of  tha  imagea  in  tha 
reproduction,  or  which  may  significantly  change 
the  uaual  method  of  filming,  are  checlced  below. 


D 


D 
0 


D 


D 


Coloured  covers/ 
Couverture  de  couleur 


p~|    Covers  damaged/ 


Couverture  endommagte 

Covers  restored  and/or  laminated/ 
Couverture  restaurte  et/ou  peliiculAe 

Cover  title  miasing/ 

La  titre  de  couverture  manque 

Coloured  maps/ 

Cartee  gtographiquaa  en  couleur 

Coloured  ink  (i.e.  other  than  blue  or  black)/ 
Encre  de  couleur  (i.e.  autre  que  bleue  ou  noire) 


r~n   Coloured  platea  and/or  illustrations/ 


Planches  et/ou  illustrations  en  couleur 

Bound  with  other  materiel/ 
Relii  avac  d'autree  documanta 

Tight  binding  may  cause  ahadowa  or  diatortion 
along  interior  margin/ 

La  re  Siure  serrAe  peut  cauaar  de  I'ombre  ou  de  la 
diatortion  la  long  de  la  marge  intirieure 

Blank  leavea  added  during  reatoration  may 
appear  within  tha  text.  Whenever  poeaible,  these 
have  been  omitted  from  filming/ 
II  se  peut  que  certainea  pagea  blanchea  ajout^aa 
lore  d'une  reatauration  apparalaaent  dana  la  texte, 
maia,  loraque  cela  Atait  poeaible,  cee  pegea  n'ont 
pea  4ti  f  llmAaa. 

Additional  commanta:/ 
Commantalrea  supplAmantairaa: 


L'Inatitut  a  microfilm^  la  meilleur  exemplaire 
qu'il  lui  a  AtA  possible  de  se  procurer.  Les  dAtaiia 
de  cet  exemplaire  qui  aont  paut-Atre  uniques  du 
point  de  vue  bibliographique,  qui  peuvent  modifier 
une  image  reproduite,  ou  qui  peuvent  exiger  une 
modification  dans  la  mAthoda  normale  de  fiimage 
sont  indiquto  ci-dessous. 


I     I  Coloured  pagea/ 


D 


Pagea  de  couleur 

Pagea  damaged/ 
Pagea  endommagAea 

Pagea  reatored  and/oi 

Pagea  reetaurAea  et/ou  pelliculAea 

Pagea  diacoioured.  stained  or  foxe* 
Pagea  dicoiortea,  tachattea  ou  piqutea 

Pagea  detached/ 
Pagea  dAtachtea 

Showthroughy 
Transparence 

Quality  of  prir 

Qualit*  InAgaia  de  I'lmpreasion 

Includee  aupplementary  materii 
Comprend  du  materiel  auppMmentaire 

Only  edition  available/ 
Seule  Mitton  diaponible 


I — I  Pagea  damaged/ 

I — I  Pagea  reatored  and/or  laminated/ 

rri  Pagea  diacoioured.  stained  or  foxed/ 

I     I  Pagea  detached/ 

rri  Showthrough/ 

I     I  Quality  of  print  varies/ 

I     I  Includee  supplementary  material/ 

I — I  Only  edition  available/ 


Thi 
to 


Th 
po 
of 
fill 


Or 
be 
th< 
sio 
oti 
fin 
sic 
or 


Pagea  wholly  or  partially  obacurad  by  errata 
Blips,  tissues,  etc.,  have  been  refllmed  to 
enaure  the  beat  poeaible  image/ 
Lea  pagea  totalement  ou  partiellement 
obacurciea  par  un  feuillet  d'errata,  une  pelure, 
etc.,  ont  4tA  fiimAes  i  nouveau  de  fapon  k 
obtenir  la  meilleure  image  poeaible. 


Thia  item  la  filmed  at  the  reduction  ratio  checked  below/ 

Ce  document  eet  film*  au  taux  de  rMuotton  indiqu4  ci-deeeout 

10X                          14X                           1IX                          22X 

2SX 

30X 

X 

12X 

16X 

20X 

MX 

2BX 

32X 

Th 
sh 
Til 
wl 

Ml 
dil 
en 
be 
rifl 
rm 
m( 


The  copy  filmed  here  he*  been  reproduced  thenks 
to  the  generoeity  of: 

Netionel  Librery  of  Cenede 


L'exempleire  filmt  fut  reproduit  grAce  A  la 
ginArotM  de: 

BIbliothAque  natlonale  du  Canada 


The  imagee  appearing  here  are  the  best  quality 
possible  considering  the  condition  and  legibility 
of  the  original  copy  and  in  keeping  with  the 
filming  contract  specificetions. 


Original  copies  in  printed  paper  covers  are  filmed 
beginning  with  the  front  cover  and  ending  on 
the  last  page  with  a  printed  or  illustrated  impres- 
sion, or  the  back  cover  when  appropriate.  All 
other  original  copies  are  filmed  beginning  on  the 
first  page  with  a  printed  or  illustrated  Impres- 
sion, and  ending  on  the  last  page  with  a  printed 
or  illustrated  impression. 


Les  images  suivantes  ont  4tA  reproduites  avec  le 
plus  grand  soin,  compte  tenu  de  la  condition  et 
de  la  nettetA  de  rexemplaire  filmA,  et  en 
conformity  avec  les  conditions  du  contrat  de 
filmage. 

Les  exemplaires  origlnsux  dont  la  couverture  en 
papier  est  imprimte  sont  filmte  en  commen^ant 
par  le  premier  plat  et  en  terminant  soit  par  la 
dernlAre  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration,  soit  par  le  second 
plat,  salon  le  cas.  Tous  les  autres  exemplaires 
originaux  sont  filmte  en  commenpant  par  la 
premiere  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration  et  en  terminant  par 
la  dernlAre  page  qui  comporte  une  telle 
empreinte. 


The  last  recorded  frame  on  each  microfiche 
shad  contain  the  symbol  ^^  (meaning  "CON- 
TINUED"), or  the  symbol  y  (meaning  "END"), 
whichever  applies. 


Un  dee  symboles  suivants  apparattra  sur  la 
derniAre  image  de  cheque  microfiche,  selon  le 
cas:  le  symbols  — ►  signifie  "A  SUIVRE",  le 
symbols  ▼  signifie  "FIN". 


Maps,  plates,  charts,  etc.,  may  be  filmed  at 
different  reduction  ratios.  Those  too  large  to  be 
entirely  included  in  one  exposure  are  filmed 
beginning  In  the  upper  left  hand  corner,  left  to 
right  and  top  to  bottom,  as  many  frames  as 
required.  The  following  diagrams  illustrate  the 
method: 


Les  cartes,  planches,  tableaux,  etc.,  peuvent  Atre 
filmte  A  dee  taux  de  reduction  diff Arents. 
Lorsque  le  document  est  trop  grand  pour  hue 
reproduit  en  un  seul  clichA,  il  est  film6  A  partir 
de  Tangle  supArieur  geuche,  de  gauche  A  droite, 
et  de  haut  en  has,  en  prenant  le  nombre 
d'images  nAcessaire.  Les  diagrammes  suivants 
illustrent  la  m^thode. 


1  2  3 


1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

i 


I 


l 


•^ 


\ 


NARRATIVE 


OF    THE 


CAMPAIGN    IN    1781 


IN 


NORTH    AMERICA. 


BY 


Sir    henry    CLINTON,  K.  B. 


HNi  ':.-!  ■'"■■■pi-^  r~ 


PHILADELPHIA: 

JOHN     CAMPBELL, 

MDCCCLXV. 


No. 


Edition  of  250  Copies, 

Of  which   75  copies  are  in   quarto,  and  25  copies 
in  folio. 


PRINTED  BY   HKNK.Y   B,   ASHMEAD, 

Nn.   I  Ici  Sair-cMM  Str(  it. 


N  A  R  R  A    r  1  V  E 

()  F 

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL 
SIR    HENRY    CLINTON,   K.  B. 

RKI.AIIVl-;    TO     HIS 

CONDUCT 

DURING 

PART  OF  HIS  COMMAND  OF  THE   KING'S  TROOPS 

I  N 

NORTH     AMERICA; 

Particularly  to  that  which  refpedls  the  unfortunate  IfTue  of 
the  Campaign  in  1781. 

WITH     AN 

APPENDIX, 

CONTAINING 

Copies  and  Extracts  of  those  Parts  of  his  Correfpondencc 

w  I  r  H 
LORD  GEORGE  GERMAIN, 

EARL  CORNWALLIS, 

REAR  ADMIRAL  G  R  A  V  E  S,  &c. 

Which  are  rctcrred  to  therein. 


LONDON: 

Printed   for   J.    Debrett    (liiccfUor   to    Mr.   Almon)   ojipofite 

Biiriington-houfe,  Piccadilly,  1783. 


i 


ERRATA. 


I'agp. 

11  the  note,    8,     - 

Line. 

3,  1781,  vice  1782. 

13.     - 

12,  either^  vice  each. 

24,     ■ 

■      19,  probably  before  hi\  at  the  begin 

ning  of  the  line. 

46,     . 

16,  their.,  vice  thus. 

52,     ■ 

■     20,  oV.  after  accomplijhed. 

I 


NARRATIVE 


O    F 


LIEUTENANT     GENERAL 


Sir   henry    CLINTON,  &c. 


"DEING  confcious,  that  during  my  com- 
mand in  North  America,  my  whole 
condud:  was  adiuated  by  the  moft  ardent 
zeal  for  the  King's  fervice,  and  the  interefts 
of  the  public,  I  was  exceedingly  mortified, 
when  I  returned  to  England,  after  a  fervice 
of  feven  years  in  that  country,  to  find  that 
erroneous  opinions  had  gone  forth  refpeding 
it;  and  that  many  perfons  had,  in  confe- 
quence,  admitted  impreflions  to  my  preju- 
A  duce. 


Ml 


1       2        ) 

duce.      Anxious,  therefore,  to  explain  what 
had  been  mifinterpreted   or  mifreprefented, 
(as  indeed  might  well  be  expedted,  from  the 
publication  of  Lord  C.'s  letter  of  the  20th  of 
Odober,  without  being  accompanied  by  my 
anfwer  to  it)  I  had  propofed  taking  an  op- 
portunity,  in    the    Houfe  of  Commons,  of 
faying  a  few  words  on   fuch   parts  of  my 
condua  as  fcemed  not  to  be  fufficiently  un- 
derftood :  and  I  flatter  myfelf  I  fhould  have 
been  able  to  make  it  appear,  that  I  adted 
up  to  the  utmoft  of  my  powers,  from  the 
beginning  to  the  end  of  my  command;  and 
that  none  of  the  misfortunes  of  the  very 
unfortunate   campaign    of    1781    can,    with 
the  fmalleft  degree  of  juftice,  be  imputed  to 

me. 

But  I  arrived  here  fo  late  in  the  feflion, 
that  I  was  advifed  to  defer  it;  and  it  was 
judged  that  the  gracious  reception  I  had  juft 
met  with  from  my  Sovereign  rendered  an 
immediate  explanation  unnecefl^ary.     I  was 

not, 


4 


(  3  ) 
not,  however,  apprifed  to  what  degree  the 
pubHc  prejudice  had  been  excited  againll 
me  ehe,  I  (hould  probably  have  been  in- 
duced to  have  taken  an  earlier  opportunity 
of  offering  to  Parliament  what  I  have  to  fay 
on  the  fubjedl.  But  the  late  change  in  pub- 
lic affairs,  furnifliing  fo  much  more  impor- 
tant matter  for  their  deliberation,  deprived 
me  of  the  opportunity  I  thought  I  ihould 
have  had :  and,  as  by  the  prefent  recefs  it 
is  probable  that  I  may  not  be  able  to  exe- 
cute my  intentions  before  a  late  period,  when 
perhaps  peculiar  circumftances  might  force 
me  through  delicacy  to  decline  it,  I  beg 
leave  to  lay  before  the  public  the  following 
plain  Narrative,  which  will,  I  truft,  remove 
prejudice  and  error. 

I  have  much  to  regret  that,  when  this 
bufinefs  was  difcuffed  in  the  Houfe  of  Lords 
laft  feffion  of  Parliament,  the  whole  of  my 
correfpondence,  with  the  late  American 
Minifter,    Lieutenant   General    Earl    Corn- 

wallis 


Si 


(     4     ) 
wallis,  and  the    Admirals   commanding  on 
the  Weft-India  and  American  ftations,  was 
not  produced,  or  at  leaft  fuch  parts  thereof 
as,  being  neceflary  to  explain   my  conduil:, 
might  have  appeared  confiftently  with  ftate 
policy.     Becaufe  the  letters  which  compofe 
that  correfpondence,  being  written   to   the 
moment    as  events  happened,  are  certainly 
the  moft  faithful  records  of  my  actions  and 
intentions;  and  are  confequently  the  clear- 
eft,  faireft,  and  moft  unexceptionable  tefti- 
monies   I   can   adduce   in  their  fupport.     I 
hope,    therefore,    I    ftiall    ftand    exculpated 
from  the  neceflity  of  the  cafe,  for  any  im- 
propriety there  may  be  in  my  annexing  to 
this  letter  fuch   of  them   as    I   may  judge 
moft  requifite  for  that  purpofe.      Three  of 
them  indeed  will,  I  prefume,  be  found  very 
material,  (Appendix  No.  IX.)  as  they  con- 
tain my  anfwers  and  obftrvations  upon  Lord 
Cornwallis's  letters  of  the  20th  of  Odlober 
and    2d    of    December    on    the   fubjed    of 

the 


J 


(  5  ) 
the  unfortunate  conclufion  of  the  laft  cam- 
paign in  the  Chefapeak ; — which  latter  I  am 
forry  to  obferve,  were  given  to  the  pubhc, 
while  mine  in  anfwer  were  withheld  trom 
it; — I  hope  without  defign. 

Although  I  never  dared  promife  myfelf 
that  any  exertions  of  mine,  with  my  very 
reduced  force  (nearly  one-third  lefs  than 
that  of  my  predecelTor)  could  bring  the  war 
to  a  happy  conclufion;  yet  I  confefs  that 
the  campaign  of  1781  terminated  very  dif- 
ferently from  what  I  once  flattered  my- 
felf it  would;  as  may  appear,  by  the  fub- 
joined  extrads  of  letters,  written  in  the  be- 
ginning  of    that   year,=^    and   which    were 

tranf- 

*  "I  am  moft  exceedingly  concerned,  my  Lord,  at 
the  very  unfortunate  affair  of  the  17th  of  January,  (Cow- 
pcr's.)  I  confefs  I  dread  the  confcquences.  But  my 
hope  is,  as  it  ever  will  be,  in  your  Lordfliip's  abilities 
and  exertions.  I  have  much  to  lament,  that  Brigadier- 
general    Arnold's    projeded    move    in    favour   of    your 

Lordlhip's 


!!! 


(     6     ) 
tranfmitted    to   the    Minifter.      I    was   led, 
however,    into   theie    hopes,    more    by    the 
apparent  diftrefles  of  the  enemy  than   any 
material  lucceffes  we  had  met  with. 

The  plan  I  had  formed  for  the  campaign 
of  1 78 1,  (upon  the  expectation  of  a  rein- 
forcement 

Lorilfhip's  operations  will  have  been  ftopt  by  the  appear- 
ance of  the  French  fliips.  Difcontcnt  runs  high  in 
Connecticut.  In  Ihort,  my  Lord,  there  feems  little 
wanting  to  give  a  mortal  (tab  to  rebellion,  but  a  proper 
reinforcement  and  a  permanent  fuperiority  at  fea  for  the 
next  campaign ;  without  which  any  enterprise  depending 
on  water  movements  muft  certainly  run  great  ri(k.  Until 
Colonel  Bruce  arrives,  I  am  uncertain  what  reinforce- 
ments are  intended  for  this  army.  The  Minifter  has 
however  afl'ured  me,  that  every  poilible  exertion  will  be 
made." — Letter  from  Sir  Henry  Clinton  to  Lord  Corn- 
wallis,  March  5,  1781. 

"I  cannot  fufficiently  exprefs  my  extreme  joy  at  read- 
ing VVafliington's  letter.  It  is  fuch  a  defcription  of 
diftrefs,  as  may  ferve  to  convince,  that  with  a  tolerable 
reinforcement  from  Europe,  to  enable  your  Excellency 
to  determine  on  an  ofFenfive  campaign,  the  year    1781 

mav 


(  7  ) 
forcement  from  Europe — from  the  Weft- 
Indies — and  from  the  Southward  (after  ope- 
ration fliould  ceafe  in  that  quarter) — added 
to  what  I  might  be  able  to  fpare  at  the  time 
from  the  fmall  force  under  my  immediate 
command  at  New- York)  was  calculated  to 
make  a  fair  and  folid  effort  in  favour  of  our 
friends — in  a  diftridt  where  I  had  fome  rea- 
fon  to  believe  they  were  numerous  and 
hearty ;  and  where  I  judged  it  might  be  made 
with  little  danger,  even  from  a  temporary 
naval  fuperiority  of  the  enemy.  This  plan 
had  been  fuggefted  to  the  Minifter  in  the 
year  1780,  and  more  particularly  ex- 
plained to  him  in  1781;  notwithftanding 
which  a  preference  was  given  to  another, 
(Appendix,    No.    I.)    which  fcemed    to   be 

forced 

may  probably  prove  the  glorious  period  to  your  command 
in  America,  by  putting  an  end  to  the  rebellion." — Letter 
from  Major-general  Phillips  to  Sir  H.  Clinton,  Portf- 
mouth,  Virginia,  April  16,  1781. 


i 


(     8     ) 
forced    (Appendix,   No.    11.)    upon    me   by 
Lord    Cornwallis's    quitting    the    Carolinas, 
where  I  had  left  him  in  the  command,  and 
marching  into  Virginia;  a  meafure,  I  muft 
fay,  determined  upon  without  my  approba- 
tion, and  very  contrary  to   my  wiHies  and 
intentions.     The    Minifter  directed   me    to 
fupport  Lord  CornwaUis  and  folid  operation 
in  Virginia;  the  danger  of  which,  without  a 
covering  fleet,  I  had  conftantly  reprefented 
to  him.     He  repeatedly  and  pofitively  pro- 
mifed  me  a  covering  fleet  ;^^  and  when  the 

Admiral 


*  Extraas  from  Lord  George  Germain's  letters  to  Sir 

Henry  Clinton: 

April  4,  1782.  "The  latenefs  of  the  feafon  will,  I 
imagine,  prevent  Monf.  De  Grafle's  undertaking  any 
thing  againrt  the  King's  poflefllons  in  the  Weft  Indies. 
But  it  is  probable,  as  foon  as  he  has  thrown  fupplies  into 
the  feveral  iflands,  he  will  proceed  to  North  America, 
and  join  the  French  forces  at  Rhode  IHand,  and  endea- 
vour to  revive  the  expiring  caufe  of  rebellion.     But  as 

Sir 


me   by 
irolinas, 
nd,  and 
I  muft 
pproba- 
les  and 
me    to 
peration 
ithout  a 
refented 
ely  pro- 
hen  the 
Admiral 

tters  to  Sir 

fon  will,  I 
taking  any 
TeA  Indies, 
iapplies  into 
1  America, 
and  endea- 
n.  But  as 
Sir 


Admiral  arrived  with  the  naval  reinforce- 
ment from  the  Weft-Indies,  he  was  clearly 

of 

Sir  George  Rodney's  force  is  little  inferior  to  his,  and  he 
will  be  watchful  of  his  motions,  I  am  not  apprehcnfive  he 
will  give  him  time  to  do  you  any  material  injury  before  he 
comes  to  your  fuccour." 

May  2,  1 78 1.  "And  as  Sir  George  Rodney  will 
bring  you  three  more  regiments  from  the  Leeward  Iflands 
before  the  hurricane  months,  the  augmentation  of  your 
force  muft,  I  fliould  think,  be  equal  to  the  utmoft  of  your 
wiflies." 

July  7,  1 78 1.  "The  arrival  of  the  reinforcement 
will,  I  hope,  enable  you  to  proceed  immediately  in  the 
execution  of  your  purpofe,  without  waiting  for  the 
three  regiments  from  the  Weft  Indies;  for  I  do  not 
expe£l  they  will  join  you  before  the  feafon  for  offenfive 
operations  there  is  over  -,  when,  I  have  reafon  to  believe, 
the  French  fleet  will  pufli  for  North  America,  and  Sir 
George  Rodney  will  certainly  follow  them,  to  prevent 
them  from  giving  you  any  interruption  in  your  operations." 

Julv  14,  1 78 1.  "The  purpofe  of  the  enemy  was 
long  known  here,  and  Sir  George  Rodney  has  been  ap- 
prifed  of  it,  and  will  certainly  not  lofc  fight  of  Monf. 

De 


B 


!p"i 


(  lo  ) 
of  opinion  himfelf,  and  of  courfe  convinced 
me,  that  he  had  brought  that  covering  fleet. 
(Appendix,  No.  III.)  Therefore,  as  Admi- 
ral Graves's  fquadron  was  acknowledged  to 
be  fuperior  to  that  under  Monfieur  de  Barras, 

I  could 


J 


De  Graffe.     The  very  proper  ftep  you  took  of  tranfmit- 
ting  him  copies  of  the  letters  you  had  intercepted,  mu(t 
confirm  him  in  the  refolution  he  had  taken  in  confequence 
of  the  former  intelligence.    But  as  in  a  matter  of  fo  great 
moment,  no  precaution  Ihould  be  omitted,  or  poflible  con- 
tingency unguarded  againft,  extrads  of  the  intercepted 
letters  will  be  fent  to  him  from  hence,  and  p-ecife  inftruc- 
tions  given  to  him  to  proceed  direftly  to  North  America, 
whenever  Monf.  De  Graffe  quits  the  Leeward  IHands." 
July  24,  1 78 1.     "And   I   truft,  that  as   Sir  George 
Rodney  knows  De  Graffe's  deftination,  and  the  French 
acknowledge  his  fhips  fail  better  than  their's,  that  he  will 
get  before  him,  and  be  in  readinefs  to  receive  him  when 
he  comes  upon  the  coart." 

September  25,  ijSl-  "I  ^rulV,  before  the  end  of 
Auguft,  Sir  Samuel  Hood  will  have  been  with  you,  and 
t  hat  after  his  jundion  with  Admiral  Graves  our  fuperiority 
at  fea  will  be  preferved." 


J 


■^ 


nvinced 
ng  fleet. 
;  Admi- 
idged  to 
2  Barras, 
I  could 

if  tranfmit- 
?pted,  niuft 
onfequence 
of  I'o  great 
loflible  con- 
intercepted 
cife  inftruc- 
;h  America, 
rd  inands." 
Sir  George 
the  French 
that  he  will 
e  him  when 

the  end  of 
nth  you,  and 
ur  fuperiority 


I  could  not  but  fuppofe  that  the  arrival  of 
Admiral  Digby  (hourly  expedled)  would 
give  us  a  moft  decifive  naval  fuperiority. — 
And  here,  perhaps,  it  may  not  be  improper 
to  remark,  that  though  the  Minifter  directs 
me,  by  his  letters  of  the  2d  of  May,  and  6th 
of  June,  to  adopt  folid  operation  in  Virginia, 
he  fignifies  to  me  his  Majefty's  approbation 
of  my  own  plan,  in  a  fubfequent  letter  of 
the  14th  of  July,  telling  me  at  the  fame 
time,  that  "he  has  not  the  leait  doubt  Lord 
"Cornwallis  will  have  fully  feen  the  rea- 
"fonablenefs  of  it,  and  has  executed  it  with 
"his  wonted  ardor,  intrepidity,  and  fuc- 
"cefs." 

Under  thefe  circumftances,  and  with  thefe 
afllirances,  I  never  could  have  the  moft  distant 
idea  that  Mr.  Walhington  had  the  leaft  hopes 
of  a  fuperior  French  fleet  in  the  Chefapeak; 
and  I  confequently  never  could  fuppofe  that 
he  would  venture  to  go  there.  But  if  he 
fliould,  I  was  fatisfied  from  the  reafons  already 

ftated 


f!rn' 


mm 


(        12       ) 

ftated,  that  I  fliould  be  able  to  meet  him 
there  with  every  advantage  on  my  fide,  by 
having  the  command  of  the  waters  of  that 
bay — without  which  he  could  not  poflibly 
feed  his  army.  This  opinion  has  been  alfo 
fince  confirmed  by  a  letter  from  him  to 
Count  De  GralTe,  dated  26th  of  September 
1 78 1,  (No.  IV.  Appendix)  wherein  he  tells 
him,  if  he  quits  the  Chefapeak,  the  enemy 
will  certainly  get  polfeflion  of  it,  and  he  muft 
difband  his  army. 

Had  my  correfpondence  been  produced, 
it  would  have  appeared  from  it,  and  the 
returns  accompanying  it,  that  inftead  of 
feventeen,  twenty,  nay  twenty-four  thouf- 
and  men,  which  it  has  been  reported  I  had 
at  New  York  (after  the  very  ample  rein- 
forcements as  the  Minifter  acknowledges 
(No.  V.  Appendix)  which  I  had  fent  to  the 
fouthward)  I  had  not  12,000  effectives,  and 
of  thefe  not  above  9,300  fit  for  duty,  re- 
gulars   and    provincials.       But    had    I    had 

twice 


i-*- 


I 


eet  him 

fide,  by 

5  of  that 

poflibly 

aeen  alio 

him    to 

eptember 

1  he  tells 

le  enemy 

d  he  muft 

produced, 
,  and  the 
inftead    of 
lur    thouf- 
rted  I  had 
nple  rein- 
:nowledges 
ent  to  the 
idives,  and 
-   duty,  re- 
nad    I    had 
twice 


(      13     ) 
twice  that   number,   I   do    not    know  that, 
after    leaving    fufficient     garrifons     in    the 
illands  and  poib  depending  (which  it  is  ad- 
mitted by  all  would  take  6000)  I  could,  as 
has   been    infinuated,    have    prevented    the 
junftion  between   Monf.   Rochambeau    and 
General  Wafliington,  which  was  made  in  the 
highlands,  at  leaft  50  miles  from  me;  or  that 
I  could  have  made  any  dired  move  againft 
their  army  when  joined  (confiding  then  of 
at   least    11,000   men,  exclufive   of  militia, 
afl-embled  on  each  fide  the   Hudfon)   with 
any  profped  of  folid  advantage  from  it.     Or 
if  I   had  as  many   reafons  to  believe  that 
Mr.  Wafliington  would  move  his  army  into 
Virginia  without   a   covering   French  fleet, 
as   I   had  to  think  he  would  not;  I  could 
not  have  prevented  his  pafling  the  Hudfon 
under  cover  of  his  forts  at  Verplanks   and 
Stoney  Points.     Nor  (fuppofing  I  had  boats 
properly  manned)  would  it  have  been  ad- 
vifeable  to  have  landed  at  Elizabeth  town, 

in 


TTT 


^ 


(  H  ) 
in  the  face  of  works  which  he  might  eafily 
have  occupied  (as  they  were  only  feven 
miles  from  his  camp  at  Chatham)  without 
fubjefting  my  army  to  be  beat,  en  detail. 
Nor  could  I,  when  informed  of  his  march 
towards  the  Delaware,  have  pafled  an  army 
in  time  to  have  made  any  impreflion  upon 
him  before  he  crolfed  that  river.  But  with 
my  reduced  force,  any  attempt  of  the  fort 
would  have  been  madnefs  and  folly  in  the 
extreme. 

With  what  might  poffibly  be  fpared  from 
fuch  a  force,  nothing  could  be  attempted 
except  againft  detachments  from  Mr.  Waih- 
ington's  army,  or  (when  reinforced  in  a 
fmall  degree)  againft  fuch  of  it's  diftant  ma- 
gazines as  might  occafionally  happen  to  be 
unguarded.  Two  of  the  latter  offered,  one 
againft  Philadelphia,  which  I  certainly  fliould 
have  attempted  in  July,  had  Lord  Corn- 
wallis  fpared  me  any  part  of  3000  men; 
but    as    his    Lordfliip  feemed    to    think    he 

could 


i 


fht  eafily 
ly    feven 

without 
?n  detail. 
is  march 
an  army 
on  upon 
But  with 

the  fort 
y  in  the 

red  from 
ttempted 
r.  Walh- 
ed  in  a 
tant  ma- 
in to  be 
red,  one 
ly  fliould 
i  Corn- 
o  men ; 
bink  he 
could 


(     '5     ) 
could  not  hold  the  ftations  we  both  thought 
eligible,  if  he  fpared   me  any  part  of  the 
force  with  him,  I  was  obliged  to  relinquiih 
this   defign.     The   other   much    more    im- 
portant, was  againft  Rhode  Ifland.      I  had 
difcovered  by  intercepted  letters  from  all  the 
French  Admirals  and  Generals,  that  Count 
Rochambeau's    army    had    marched    from 
Rhode  Illand  to  join  Mr.  Wafhington  at  the 
White    Plains;    that    their    battering    train 
and  ftores  for  fiege  were  left  at  Providence 
under  little  more  than  a  militia  guard;  and 
that  their  fleet  remained    in    Rhode   Illand 
harbour  with  orders,  as  foon  as  repaired,  to 
retire  to  Bofton  for  fecurity.     By  private  in- 
formation, which  I  had  at  that  time,  I  found 
alfo  that  the  works  at  Rhode  Illand  were  in 
a  great  meafure  difmantled,  and  had  only  a 
few  invalids  and  militia  to  guard  them,  and 
that  they  were  both  there  and  at  Providence 
under  great   apprehenlions  of  a  vifit  from 
us.     From  other  motives  as  well  as  my  own 

knowledge 


n 


(      1 6      ) 

knowledge  of  thele  polls,  I  had  the  ftrongeft 
realbn  to  exped  the  tulleft  fuccefs  to  an  at- 
tempt againrt  them,  and  I  therefore  immedi- 
ately propofed  to  Admiral  Graves  a  joint  ex- 
pedition for  that  piirpofe ;  which  he  readily 
confented    to.      It  was   accordingly    agreed 
between  us,  that  it  fliould  be  undertaken  as 
foon  as  he   could   aifemble  his  fleet,  and  a 
fmall  reinforcement  (hourly  expedled)  fliould 
arrive    from    Europe.       The    reinforcement 
joined  me  on  the   nth  of  Auguft,  and  the 
Admiral  (who  had  failed  on  a  cruife)  having 
returned  to  the  coafl:  on  the  i6th,  I  imme- 
diately renewed  my  propofal,  (Appendix,  No. 
VI.)     The  Admiral  informed  me  in  anfwer, 
that  he  was  under  the  neceflity  of  fending 
the  Robufte  to  the  yard  to  be  refitted,  and 
that  he  fliould  take  the  opportunity  while 
that  was  doing  of  fliifting  a  mafl:  or  two  in 
the  Prudente ;  and  when  thofe  repairs  were 
accompliflied,    he    would    give    me    timely 
notice,    (Appendix,    No.    VII.)     The    fliips 

were 


ftrongeil 
to  an  at- 
;  imniedi- 
.  joint  ex- 
he  readily 
ly    agreed 
jrtaken  as 
;et,  and  a 
;d)  (liould 
forcement 
:,  and  the 
fe)  having 
,  I  imme- 
;ndix,  No. 
in  anfwer, 
3f  fending 
:iitted,  and 
lity  while 
or  two  in 
pairs  were 
ne    timely 
The    fliip3 
were 


(  '7  ) 
were  not  ready  on  the  zSth ;  Sir  Samuel 
Hood,  however,  arriving  on  that  day,  I  im- 
mediately ordered  the  troops  to  be  embarked ; 
and  going  to  the  Admirals  on  Long  Ifland,  I 
propofed  to  them  that  the  expedition  fliould 
inftantly  take  place :  but  receiving  intelligence 
that  evening  that  Monfieur  De  Barras  had 
failed  on  the  25th,  it  was  of  courfe  flopped. 
Thus,  to  the  Admirals  great  mortification 
and  my  own,  was  loft  an  opportunity  of 
making  the  moft  important  attempt  that  had 
offered  the  whole  war. 

Early  in  September,  to  my  great  furprife, 
(for  I  ftill  confidered  our  fleet  as  fuperior) 
hearing  that  Mr.  Wafliington  was  decidedly 
marching  to  the  fouthward,  I  called  a  council 
of  all  the  general  officers,  who  unanimoufly 
concurred  with  me  in  opinion,  that  the  only 
way  to  fuccour  Earl  Cornwallis  was  to  go  to 
him  in  the  Chefapeak. 

Although  I  had  every  reafon  to  difapprove 

of  Earl   Cornwallis's   march  into   Virginia, 

c  without 


.Jl 


ws 


without  conlulting  me,  (at  the  rick  of  en- 
gaging me  in  dangerous  operations,  for  which 
I  was  not  prepared)  yet,  as  I  fuppofed  he  afted 
with  at  leaft  the  approbation  of  the  Minifter, 
I  left  him  as  free  as  air,  when  he  arrived 
there,  to  plan  and  execute  according  to  his 
difcretion ;— only  recommending  to  him,  m 
cafe  he  had  none  of  his  own,  the  plan  I  had 
offered  to  the  Minifter ;  which,  notwithftand- 
ing  the  opinion  given  in  the  letter  of  July  14, 
before  quoted,-==  I  did  not,  however,  find  his 

Lordfhip 


^ 


ex 


*  Extraa  from  Lord  George  Germain's  letter  to  Sir 

Henry  Clinton,  July  14,  lyS'-""!'  '«  ^'''^'^  '^^  """'^ 
unfeigned  pleafure  I  obey  his  Majefty's  commands,  ni 
prcfling  to  you  his  royal  approbation  of  the  plan  you 
have  adopted  for  profecuting  the  war  in  the  provinces 
fouth  of  the  Delaware,  and  of  the  fuccours  you  have 
furnifhed,  and  the  inftrudions  you  have  given  for  car- 
rying it  into  execution.  The  copies  of  the  very  impor- 
tant correfpondence  which  fo  fortunately  fell  into  your 
hands,  (inclofed  in  your  difpatch)  fhew  the  rebel  aftairs 
to  be  almoft  defperate,  and  that  nothing  but  the  succefs 

of 


**» 


/■ 


of  en- 
•r  which 
he  afted 
/linifter, 

arrived 
g  to  his 

him,  in 
an  I  had 
ithftand- 
■July  14, 
,  find  his 
Lordfliip 

letter  to  Sir 
:h  the  moll 
mmands,  in 
he  plan  you 
le  provinces 
rs  you  have 
ven  for  car- 
very  inipor- 
;11  into  your 
rebel  affairs 
t  the  succefs 
of 


(  '9  ) 
Lordfliip  the  leaft  indined  to  adopt.  And 
that  letter,  which  I  did  not  receive  till  Sep- 
tember, found  me  deeply  and  dangeroully  en- 
gaged in  the  operation  he  had  forced  me  into. 
And  here,  perhaps,  it  may  be  proper  to 
give  the  reafons  which  induced  me  to  recom- 
mend 

of  fome  extraordinary   enterprize   can   give   vigour  and 
adivity  to  their  caufe ;  and  I  confcfs  I  am  well  pleafed 
that  they  have  fixed  upon  New  York  as  the  objedt  to  be 
attempted,  as  I  have  not  the  leaft  doubt  but  that  the 
troops  you  had  remaining  with  you,  after  the  ample  rein- 
forcements you    (o  judicioufly  fent    to    the  Chefapeak, 
would  be  fully  fufficient  under  your  command  to  repel 
any  force  the  enemy  could  bring  againft  you.     I  cannot 
clofe  this  letter,  without  repeating  to  you  the  very  great 
fatisfadtion  your  difpatch  has  given  me;   and   my  moft 
entire  and  hearty  coincidence  with  you  in  the  plan  you 
have  propofed  to   Lord   Cornwallis,   for  diftrefling  the 
rebels,  and  recovering  the  fouthern  provinces  to  the  King's 
obedience.     And  as  his  Lordftiip,  when  he  received  your 
letters  of  the  8th  and  nth  of  June,  will  have  fully  fecn 
the  reafonablenefs  of  it,  I  have  not  the  leaft  doubt  but  his 
Lordftiip  has  executed  it  with  his  wonted  ardor,  intrepidity, 
and  fucccfs." 


i 
4 


I     ! 


mm 


(  20  ) 
mend  to  Lord  Cornwallis  to  lecure  a  naval 
ftation  for  large  fliips,  if  one  could  be  found 
that  was  capable  of  being  fortified  and  main- 
tained againft  a  temporary  fuperiority  of  the 
enemy  at  fea,  agreeable  to  the  inftrudtions 
which  I  had  before  given  to  General  Phil- 
lips, and  which  were  of  courfe  to  be  now 
confidered  as  fuch  to  his  LordHiip,  (Ap- 
pendix, No.  X.) 

Although  I  ought  not  to  have  apprehend- 
ed that  the  enemy  could  have  had  a  fuperi- 
ority at  fea,  after  the  aflurances  I  had  re- 
ceived   from    the    Minifter,    I    yet    always 
wilhed  to  guard  againft  even   a    poffibility 
of  it.      Finding,  therefore,  by  Lord  Corn- 
wallis's  letters,   that  on   his    arrival    in  the 
Chelapeak,  he  had  no  plan  of  his  own  to 
propofe,    and    that    he    did    not    incline    to 
follow   the  one  I  had  offered  to  his  con- 
fideration,  I  recommended  the  taking  a  re- 
fpedable  defenfive  ftation  either  at  Williamf- 
burg,    or    York    (the    latter    of    which    his 

Lordfhip 


J 


;  a  naval 
be  found 
nd  main- 
ty  of  the 
ftrudtions 
iral  Phil- 
)  be  now 
lip,   (Ap- 

pprehend- 
l  a  fuperi- 
I  had  re- 
el   always 

poffibility 
:>rd  Corn- 
'al  in  the 
lis  own  to 
incline  to 
)  his  con- 
king a  re- 

Williamf- 

which    his 

Lordlhip 


(       21        ) 

Lordfhip  had  informed  me  in  a  letter,  dated 
26th  of  May,  he  was  inclined,  from  the 
reports  which  had  been  made  to  him,  to 
think  well  of  as  a  naval  ftation  and  place 
of  arms)  and  left  his  Lordfliip  at  liberty 
to  keep  all  the  troops  he  had  in  Virginia, 
(amounting  to  about  feven  thoufand  men). 
But  thinking  that  he  might  well  fpare  three 
thoufand;  I  defired  he  would  keep  all  that 
were  necelfary  for  a  refped:able  defenfive, 
and  defultory  water  movements,  and  fend 
me  of  three  thoufand  men  all  he  could. 
His  Lordfliip  mifconceiving  my  intentions 
(as  will,  I  truft,  be  manifefl:  to  whoever 
reads  our  correfpondence)  and  coniidering 
my  call  for  three  thoufand  men  as  uncon- 
ditional, tells  me  that  he  could  not  with 
the  remainder  keep  York  and  Gloucefter; 
and  that  he  fliould,  therefore,  repafs  James- 
river  and  go  to  the  ftation  at  Portfmouth. 
Which  refolution  (I  confefs)  furprifed  me, 

as 


J 


(       22       ) 

as  he  had  a  Httle  before,  in  the  letter  above 
quoted,  repreiented  that   port  as  unhealthy, 
and   requiring   an  army   to  defend  it.     On 
receipt  of  his  Lordlhip's  letter,  I  immedi- 
ately  confulted  the    Admiral,  who   was  of 
of  opinion,  that  a  naval  ftation  for  large  fliips 
was  abfolutely  neceffary,  and  recommended 
Hampton-road.     Therefore  in  my  letter  of 
the   nth  July,  I  direded  his    Lordlhip   to 
examine    and   fortify    Old    Point    Comfort, 
which  the  Admiral  and   I   thought  would 
cover  that  Road,  and  in  which  there  had  been 
a  fort  for  that  purpofe  for  fifty  years,  though 
probably  then  in  ruins.    But  his  Lordfliip  in- 
forming me  in  his  letter  of  the  27th  of  July, 
that  it  was  the  opinion  of  the  captains  of  the 
navy,  the   engineers,  and  himfelf,  that  any 
works  ereded  on  Old  Point  Comfort,  "might 
"be  eafily  deftroyed  by  a  fleet,  and  would 
"not  anfwer  the  purpofe;    and  that    there- 
"fore,  according  to  the  fpirit  of  my  orders, 

"he 


m 


1 


,** 


er  above 
ihealthy, 

it.     On 
immedi- 
>   was  of 
irge  fliips 
nmended 

letter  of 
rdlhip   to 
Comfort, 
ht  would 
;  had  been 
rs,  though 
rdfliip  in- 
:h  of  July, 
lins  of  the 
,  that  any 
rt,  "might 
md  would 
hat    there- 
my  orders, 


(      23      ) 

"he  fliould  feize  York  and  Gloucefter,  as 
"the  only  harbour  in  which  he  could  hope 
"to  be  able  to  give  efFedtual  protedlion  to 
"line  of  battle  fliips;"  I  fuppofed  his  Lord- 
fliip  had  entirely  approved  of  thofe  ports; 
and  that  after  examining  them  with  the 
officers  of  the  King's  fliips  and  his  engineer, 
he  would  let  me  know  if  he  fliould  fee 
reafon  to  alter  his  opinion ;  and  confequently 
I  did  not  objed:  to  the  choice  he  had  made; 
nor  indeed  had  I  ever  caufe  to  do  fo  before 
I  faw  his  letter  of  the  1 1  th  of  Odlober, 
which  I  did  not  receive  until  the  i6th,  the 
day  before  he  offered  to  capitulate,  when  for 
the  firfl:  time  I  found  his  Lordfliip  thought 
unfavourably  of  them.  For  on  the  i6th  of 
Auguft,  his  Lordfliip  told  me  that  he  fliould 
apply  to  the  Commodore  for  a  fliip  to  send 
me  a  ftate  of  things  at  York,  and  bring  him 
back  my  commands;  by  which  I  was  of 
courfe  to  underftand  that  his  Lordfliip  would 
fend  me  his  own  and  the  Commodore's  opi- 
nion 


(        24        ) 

nion  of  York  and  Gloucefter,  after  his  en- 
gineer had  made  a  moft  exadl  furvey,  which 
he  told  me  he  was  employed  in,  and  of 
which  I  expeded  a  copy,  as  his  Lordfliip 
had  before  fent  me  of  the  one  taken  of  Old 
Point  Comfort.  But  not  receiving  thefe 
from  his  Lordfliip,  I  naturally  concluded  that 
the  port  of  York  and  Gloucefter  was  fuch  as 
his  Lordfliip  and  the  Commodore  approved; 
efpecially,  as  his  Lordfliip,  in  his  letter  of  the 
22d  of  Augufl:,  was  pleafed  to  fay,  "the 
"engineer  has  finiflied  his  furvey  and  exa- 
"mination  of  this  place,  (York)  and  has 
"propofed  his  plan  for  fortifying  it;  which 
"appearing  judicious,  I  have  approved,  and 
"directed  to  be  executed."  And  in  the  same 
letter  it  was  farther  implied,  that  through 
the  exertion  of  the  troops,  the  works  would 
be  tolerably  complete  in  about  fix  weeks 
from  that  period:  and  from  his  faying  also 
in  the  same  letter,    "I  will  not  venture  to 

"take 


:fter,  after  his  en- 
<aa  furvey,  which 
)loyed   in,   and   ot 
T,  as  his  Lordfliip 
one  taken  of  Old 
)t    receiving    thefe 
ally  concluded  that 
ucefter  was  fuch  as 
imodore  approved ; 
,  in  his  letter  of  the 
:afed   to    fay,   "the 
is  furvey  and  exa- 
:,   (York)    and    has 
brtifying  it;  which 
have  approved,  and 
"    And  in  the  same 
plied,  that  through 
3S,  the  works  would 
n    about   fix  weeks 
from  his  laying  also 
will  not  venture  to 
"  take 


(      25      ) 

"take  any  ftep  that  might  retard  the  efta- 
"hlilhing  this  poll.      But  I  requeft  that  your 
"Excellency  will  pleafe   to  decide  whether 
"it  is  moft  important  for  your  plans,  that  a 
"detachment  of  a  thouland  or  twelve  hun- 
"dred  men  (which  I  think  I  can  fpare  from 
"every   other   purpofe    but    that   of  labour) 
"  (hould  be  fent  to  you  from  hence,  or  that 
"the  whole  of  the  troops  here  (hould  con- 
"tinue   to   be   employed   in   expediting    the 
"works,")    I    naturally    concluded    that    his 
Lordfliip  had  not  only  fufficient  to  complete 
his  works  by  the  time  he  mentioned,  but  that 
he  could  fpare  that  number  from  the  defence 
of  them  afterwards.     His  Lordfliip's  letter  of 
the  29th  of  September  moreover  told  me,  "  I 
"  have  no  doubt,  if  relief  arrives  in  any  reafon- 
"able  time,  that  both  York  and  Glouceflier 
"  will  be  in  polTelTion  of  his  Majesty's  troops ;" 
and  again,  that  of  the  3d  of  Odober,  "  My 
"  works  are  in  a  better  fliate  of  defence  than 


'we 


D 


I'^Tr 


(    26    ) 

♦'we  had  reafon  to  hope."     In  (liort,  I  think 
his  Lordlhip  appears  to  have  impHed  in  all 
his  letters,  (except  that  of  the   17th  of  Sep- 
tember, the  day  he  heard  from  Lieutenant 
Conway  of  the  navy,  that  Monf.  De  Grafle, 
by  the  jundlion  of  Monfieur  de  Barras,  had 
thirty-five  or  thirty-fix  fail  of  the  line)  that 
he  could  hold  out  as  long  as  his  provifions 
lafted— which  was,  by  his   Lordlhip's  own 
calculation,  to  the  end  of  Oaober  at  leaft. 

From  all  thefe  circumftances,  I  had  flat- 
tered myfelf,  that  the  works  at  York  would 
have  been  tolerably  complete  by  the  9th  of 
06tober,  the   day   Mr.  Walliington  opened 
his  batteries  againft  them :  and  from  the  opi- 
nion given  me  by  certain  officers  of  rank, 
who  had  lately  come  from  Lord  Cornwallis 
at  York,  I  was  under  no  apprehenfions  for 
his  Lorddiip  before  the  latter  end  of  that 
month;   as   I   could   not   conceive   that    the 
enemy  could  poffibly  bring  againft  him  fuch 

a  powerful 


J 


^ 


,  I  think 
ed  in  all 
1  of  Sep- 
ieutenant 
)e  Graffe, 
arras,  had 
line)  that 
provifions 
lip's  own 
at  leaft. 

had  flat- 
3rk  would 
the  9th  of 
)n  opened 
n  the  opi- 
;  of  rank, 
Cornwallis 
enfions  for 
id  of  that 
;   that    the 
t  him  fuch 
a  powerful 


t 


{     27     } 
a  powerful  battering  train  as  would  den.olifli 
his  defences  (fuch  as  I  had  reafon  to  hope 
they  would  be)  in  fo  Ihort  a  fpace  of  time  as 
nine  or  ten  days. 

Although  I  never  gave  Lord  Cornwallis 
aifurances  of  the  exertions  of  the  navy  before 
my  letter  of  the  24th  of  September,  when  I 
did  it  in  confequence  of  a  council  of  war, 
compofed  of  flag  and  general  officers ;  I  cer- 
tainly never  gave  his  Lordlhip  the  leaft  reafon 
to  fuppofe  they  would  not  be  made;  as  I 
always  took  it  for  granted,  before  Admiral 
Graves's  letter  to  me  of  the  9th  of  September, 
that  our  fleet  was  fuperior  to  that  of  the  enemy. 
Nor,  indeed,  did  I  know  before  I  received 
Lord  Cornwallis's  letter  of  the  17th,  (which 
was  not  until  the  23d  of  September)  that  the 
enemy  had  thirty-fix  fail  of  the  line,  or  that 
Monfieur  de  Barras  had  not  already  joined 
Monfieur  de  GralTe  before  the  adion  of  the 
5th  of  September.  But  even  againft  this 
fuperiority,   great  as    it   was,   the  Admirals 

were 


J 


^^ 


(  28  ) 

were  clearly  of  opinion,  that  a  joint  attempt 
(iKHild  be  made  by  us  to  luccour  the  fleet 
and  army  in  the  Chelapeak.  I  certainly, 
therefore,  never  could  have  hinted  to  his 
Lordfliip  that  their  exertions  would  not  be 
made.  The  whole  of  this  matter  may,  I 
think,  be  fummed  up  as  follows: 

Lord   Cornwallis's    march    into   Virginia, 
without  confuting  his  Commander  in  Chief, 
forced  us  into  folid  operation  in  that  province. 
Being  there,  as  his  Lordlhip  could  not  fub- 
fift  his  army  without  having  a  place  of  arms 
to  cover  his  magazines,  &c.  &c.  Sec.  it  became 
abfolutely  necellary  to  fix  on  fome  healthy 
and  refpedtable  ftation,  that  could  be  made 
fecure  againft  a  temporary  fuperiority  of  the 
enemy  at  fea;  and  York  and  Gloucefter  feem 
to  have  been  originally  thought  of  by  Lord 
Cornwallis,  and  approved  by  me  for  that  pur- 
pofe.     But  by  his  Lordfliip's  mifconceiving 
my  orders,  he  quitted  the  Neck  of  York,  and 
confequently  relinquiflied  every  idea  of  occu- 
pying 


J 


attempt 
he  fleet 
ertainly, 
I  to  his 
I  not  be 
may,  I 

V^irginia, 

in  Chief, 

province. 

not  fub- 

of  arms 
t  became 
;  healthy 
be  made 
ty  of  the 
fter  feem 

by  Lord 
that  pur- 
onceiving 
V'ork,  and 
1  of  occu- 
pying 


(  29  ) 
pying  thofe  ports.  Soon  afterwards,  the 
Admiral  thinking  a  naval  ftation  for  large 
(hips  abfolutely  necelfary,  and  recommend- 
ing Hampton  Road,  I  direded  Lord  Corn- 
wallis  to  examine  and  fortify  Old  Point 
Comfort  in  James  River;  but  his  Lordlhip 
not  approving  of  that  ftation,  made  choice  ot 
York  and  Gloucefter. 

I  perfealy  agree  with   Lord  Cornwallis, 
that  to  abandon  his  ports,  after  he  had  once 
fixed    himfelf,    (although    by    doing    fo    he 
might  fave  part  of  his   army)  would  have 
been   difgraceful,  nay,  perhaps  fatal   to  our 
future  profpeas  of  ertablifliment  in  the  Che- 
fapeak,  when  fuch  a  meafure  rtiould  be  au- 
thorifed  by  a  covering  fleet.     But  even  that 
misfortune,  great  as  it  may  be  reprefented, 
would  have  been  preferable  to  the  one  which 
happened;  and  therefore  I  told  his  Lordlhip, 
in  a  converlation  I   had  with  him  before  I 
fent  his  letter  of  the  20th  of  Odober  to  be 
printed  at  New  York,  I  had  conceived  hopes, 

that 


m 


{    30   ) 

that  between  the  time  of  the  French  fleet's 
arriving  in  the  Chefapeak,  and  his  receiv- 
ing inforniation  tVoni  nie  that  Sir  Samuel 
Hood  had  joined  Mr.  (Jraves,  which  was  not 
until  the  13th  of  September,  or  between  that 
time  and  the  jundion  of  Mr.  Walliington 
with  the  IVIarquis  De  la  Fayette,  when  his 
Lordlhip  heard  from  Lieutenant  Conway  of 
the  navy,  that  the  enemy  were  thirty-fix  fail 
of  the  line,  he  would  have  tried  to  efcape 
with  part  of  his  army  to  the  fouthward;  a 
ftep  which  certainly  would  have  been  jufli- 
fiable,  although  in  the  converfation  alluded 
to,  his  Lordlliip  did  not  feem  to  think  it 
would,  unlefs  I  had  given  him  all'urances 
that  the  navy  could  not  attempt  to  fuccour 
him;  which  aifurances,  however,  I  certainly 
could  not  pollibly  have  given  him. 

If,  therefore.  Lord  Cornwallis's  letter  of 
the  20th  of  0<il:ober,  giving  an  account  of 
the  unfortunate  conclulion  of  the  campaign, 
by  the  furrender  of  York  Town,  (Appendix, 

No. 


i 


:h  rtcet's 

recciv- 

Siimuel 

was  not 

ecn  that 

(hington 

•hen  his 

)invay  of 

y-i'ix  Uiil 

0  elcape 
iward;  a 
en  jufti- 

1  alluded 
think  it 
rturances 
)  fuccour 
certainly 

letter  of 
:count  of 
ampaign, 
ippendix, 

No. 


No.  \'III.)  could  ever  have  heen  underftood 
to  imply  that  the  ports  of  York  and  Glou- 
ceiler  were  not  his  Lordlhip's  own  choice, 
in  preference  to  Old  Point  Comfort,  which 
I  had  recommended  to  him ;  or  that  I  had 
ever  received  information  from  his  Lordihip, 
that  the  ground  at  either  was  unfavourahle, 
till  the  day  before  he  had  offered  to  capitu- 
late; or  that  I  had  ever  given  him  any  alfu- 
rances  of  the  exertions  of  the  navy,  before 
my  letter  to  him  of  the  24th  of  September, 
which  he  acknowledges  he  did  not  receive 
till  the  29th ;  or  that  any  affurances  whatfo- 
ever  given  by  me  could  have  prevented  his 
attacking  the  Marquis  De  la  Fayette,  before 
Mr.  Wafliington  joined  that  General,  which 
was  on  the  27th  of  September;  I  am  per- 
fuaded  it  will  appear  that  thofe  implications 
are  not  founded  on  any  orders    I   gave  his 
Lordihip,  and  cannot  be  fupported  by  any 
part  of  our  correfpondence.     And  as  I  took 
an  opportunity  of  telling  his  Lordihip  the 

fame, 


3^ 


fame,  in  a  letter  I  Tent  him  before  he  failed 
from  New-York,  dated  the  2d  and  loth  of 
December  (which  letter,  however,  did  not 
appear  when  this  part  of  our  correfpondence 
was  produced  before  the  Houfe  of  Lords)  I 
cannot  doubt  his  Lordlhip  is  convinced  that 
what  I  therein  aiferted  is  right. 

Lord  Cornwallis  was  pleafed  to  tell  me 
that  his  letter  of  the  20th  of  Oftober,  was 
written  under  great  agitation  of  mind  and  in 
a  great  hurry.  No  man  could  poffibly  feel 
for  his  Lordlliip,  and  his  dreadful  fituation, 
more  than  I  did.  And  I  will  venture  to  fay, 
no  man  could  be  more  anxious,  or  would 
have  gone  greater  lengths  to  fuccour  him. 
Nor  will  this,  I  truft,  be  doubted,  when  it  is 
recollected  that  the  propofal  firft  came  from 
me  for  embarking  fix  thoufand  men  for  that 
purpofe  on  board  an  inferior  fleet  of  twenty- 
feven  fail  of  the  line,  including  two  fifties,  to 
thirty-fix;  and  thereby  putting  the  fate  of 
the  American  war  on  the  joint  exertions  of 

the 


th 

an 

no 

ral 

of 

ren 

to 

int 

foil 

ad 

alfc 

ra' 

m 

V 

o 

th 

en' 

ha 

fid 

w; 


T-^ 


failed 
oth  of 
id  not 
iidence 
ords)  I 
ed  that 

tell  me 
ler,  was 
I  and  in 
bly  feel 
tuation, 
e  to  fay, 
r  would 
ur  him. 
hen  it  is 
me  from 
for  that 
twenty- 
fifties,  to 
3  fate  of 
jrtions  ot 
the 


(     33     ) 
the  fleet  and  army,  to  relieve  that  noble  Lord 
and  his  gallant  corps. 

I  have  to  lament  that  thefe  exertions  could 
not  have  been  made  in  time.    All  the  Admi- 
rals feemed  of  opinion  at  the  council  of  war 
of  the  24th  September  that  there  was  every 
reafon  to  hope  that  the  fleet  would  be  ready 
to  lail  on  the  5th  of  Odiober.     The  troops 
intended  for    the   expedition   had  been   for 
fome  time  in  readinefs  to  embark,  and  did 
adlually  do  fo  early  in  October.     It  feemed 
alfo  to  be  the  general  opinion  of  the  Admi- 
rals, that  the  enemy,  although  fuperior   in 
number,  could  not  obrtrud  the  channel  to 
York-river,    fo    as    to    prevent    the    palTage 
of    our   fleet,    much    lefs    both    palTages    of 
the  Chefapeak.     Could    the    troops,  which 
embarked  under  my  immediate  command, 
have  been  put  on  fliore  on  the  Gloucefter 
fide,  a  jundlion  with  the  part  of  Lord  Corn- 
wallis's  corps  on  that  fide  was  easy:  but  if 

they 


(  34  ) 
they  had  been  put  on  Ihore,  even  in  James 
River,  aUhoiigh  a  junction  with  his  Lord- 
ihip  in  York  would  have  been  Icarcely  practi- 
cable, it  might  have  been  made  in  ibme  other 
part;  or  at  leaft  fuch  diveriions  might  have 
been  made  by  the  troops  under  my  command 
as  might  have  laved  part  of  his  Lordlliip's 
corps,  (Appendix,  No.  XI.) 

I  murt,  therefore,  repeat  that  I  lament, 
and  ever  Ihall,  that  thofe  exertions  could 
not  have  been  made  in  time.  Becaufe,  from 
the  profellional  merit  of  the  Admirals  who 
were  to  condudl  us,  and  from  the  zeal 
which  appeared  fo  confpicuous  when  I  pro- 
pofed  the  move  to  them ;  and  which,  from 
their  example  was  communicated  to  all 
ranks  in  the  fleet;  and  with  which,  it  is  to 
be  prefumed,  thofe  of  the  army  kept  fully 
equal  pace;  I  have  every  reafon  to  think  we 
lliould  have  had  moll  complete  fuccefs. 

But  at   the  fame   time,   that   truth   com- 
pels 


( 


James 

Lord- 
prafti- 
e  other 
It  have 
tnmand 
rdlliip's 

lament, 
s  could 
fe,  from 
als  who 
he    zeal 
1  I  pro- 
:h,  from 
I    to    all 
1,  it  is  to 
ept  fully 
think  we 
:efs. 

,th   com- 
pels 


(     35     ) 
pels    me   to    impute    our    misfortunes    ulti- 
mately to  the  want  of  a   covering  fleet  in 
the  Chefapeak,  I  think  it  right  to  declare 
that,  as  a  land  officer,  I  do  not  feel  myfelf 
a   competent  judge    of   the    propriety    and 
praaicahility  of  naval  operations.     Nor  can 
I,  as  a  fervant  of  the  State,  entrulted  with 
an   important,    but   partial    command,  pre- 
fume  to  enter  into  the  counfel  of  Minifters; 
who,  from  a   more  elevated  llation,  furvey 
and  balance  the  whole  fyrtem  of  the  cam- 
paign, and  the  general  lafety  and  welfare  ot 

the  empire."-' 

Upon 

*  "  I  am,  however,  aware  of  the  difficulties  Adminis- 
tration muft  neccfllirily  be  expoCed  to,  from  the  variety  of 
important  matters  which  demand  its  attention.  And  tar 
be  it  from  mc,  my  Lord,  to  impute  the  delays  I  ha\  c  ex- 
pcM-ienced  to  anv  of  the  King's  Ministers;  but  I  cannot 
avoid  lamenting  that  they  do  happen,  and  I  tremble  for 
the  fatal  confeiiuenccs  which  may  poffibly  fome  time  or 
other  enfuc."— Sir  Henry  Clinton's  letter  to  Lord  George 
Germain,  dated  April  30,  178 1. 


(  36  ) 
Upon  the  whole,  I  am  perfuaded,  that  had 
I  been  left  to  my  own  plans,  and  a  proper 
confidence  had  been  earlier  repofed  in  me, 
the  campaign  of  1781  would  not  probably 
have  ended  unfortunately.  But  though  that 
apparent  want  of  confidence  was  at  laft  re- 
moved,* and  the  fulleft  approbation  I  could 

wifli 


*  "The  uneafinefs  you  exprcfs  on  a  certain  occafion, 
muft  have  ccafed  long  before  this  reaches  you,  and,  I 
truft,  in  full  time  to  prevent  your  rcfigning  the  command 
to  Earl  Cornwallis.  The  meflage  I  fent  you  by  Lieu- 
tenant-colonel Bruce  was  taken  in  writing  to  avoid  any 
miftakes:  for,  as  I  was  confcious  of  your  having  every 
reafon  to  be  fatisfied  with  the  protection  fhewn  to  you  by 
the  King,  and  with  the  conftant  defire  of  his  Minifters  to 
give  you  all  poflible  fupport,  I  could  not  help  regretting 
that  there  (hould  have  been  the  leaft  appearance  of  that 
want  of  confidence  between  us,  which  might  prejudice 
the  public  I'ervice.  Your  explanation  upon  that  fubjctft 
is  perfectly  fatisfadtory ;  and  you  may  depend  upon  find- 
ing every  attention  on  my  part  to  thofc  requifitions  which 
you  may  have  occafion  to  make.  The  variety  of  fervices 
now  carrying  on   in   dift'crcnt   parts  of  the  world   muft 

account 


(     37     ) 
wifli  given  to  the  operations  I  had  projedted, 
my  knowledge  of  the  change  happened  too 
late  to  extricate  me  from  the  confequences 
of  Lord   Cornvvallis's    ill-fated   march    into 
Virginia,  and  the  orders  they  had  probably 
occafioned.       Forefeeing  many  of  the  evils 
which  would   refult  from    this  fatal    move 
the  inftant  I  heard  of  it,  I  immediately  at 
the  time  communicated  my  apprehenfions  to 
the  American  Minifter.     And  as  my  letter 
to  him  of  the    i8th  of  July,   1781,  fpeaks 
very  fully  on  this  and  other  matters,  of  which 
I  fear  the  public  has  been  hitherto  equally 
mifinformed,  I  (hall  take  the  liberty  to  con- 
clude this  Narrative  with  the  following  ex- 
trad:  from  it : 

"I  can 

account  for  the  difappointments  you  fometimes  fufFer. 
But  you  may  rert  artured,  that  every  department  of 
Government  is  anxious  to  furnifli  you  with  the  mod 
effedual  means  of  carrying  on  the  war  with  honour  to 
yourfelf,  and  with  advantage  to  the  State."— Extratft  from 
Lord  George  Germain's  Letter  to  Sir  Henry  Clinton, 
dated  July  7th,  1781. 


■1 


(  3«  ) 
"I  can  liiy  little  more  to  your  Lord- 
fliip's  languine  hopes  of  the  fpeedy  reduc- 
tion of  the  fouthern  provinces,  than  to  la- 
ment that  the  prefent  ftate  of  the  war  there 
does  not  altogether  promife  fo  flattering  an 
event.  Many  untoward  incidents,  of  which 
your  Lordrtiip  was  not  apprifed,  have  thrown 
us  too  far  hack  to  he  able  to  recover  very 
V'  >n,  even  what  we  have  lately  loft  there. 
A"  ii  (as  I  have  often  before  fuggefted)  the 
goou-uili  of  the  inhabitants  is  abfolutely 
requilite  to  retain  a  country,  after  we  have 
conquered  it;  I  fear  it  will  be  fometime  be- 
fore we  can  recover  the  confidence  of  thofe 
in  Carolina,  as  their  paft  fufferings  will  of 
courfe  make  them  cautious  of  publicly  for- 
warding the  King's  interefts  before  there  is 
the  ftrongeft  certainty  of  his  army  being  in 
a  condition  to  fupport  them.  I  (hall,  there- 
fore, moft  cordially  join  with  your  Lord- 
fliip,  in  condemning  the  bad  policy  of  taking 
polfellion  of  places  at  one  time,  and  abandon- 
ing 


1 
t 
c 

I 
r 
c 
v 
C 
c 


ing 


(     39     ) 
ini^  them   at  another;   and   in   the  opinion 
that   the   war  fliould  be  condudted  upon  a 
permanent  and  fettled  plan  of  conqueft,  by 
fecuring  and  preferving  what  has  been  re- 
covered.    But  if  thefe   maxims  have  been, 
on  any  occafion,  deviated  from  in  the  pall 
progrefs  of  the  war;  I  muft,  in  juftice  to 
myfelf  declare,  that  it  has  never  been  war- 
ranted by   my  orders,  except,  only  in    the 
cafe  of  Rhode-Illand.       This   I   doubt  not 
will  appear  from  the  inftrudions  I  gave  to 
General  Leflie,  and  the  other  general  offi- 
cers, whom   I   fent   on   expeditions    to    the 
Chefipeak.      For  if  Lord  Cornwallis  made 
a  defultory  move  into  North  Carolina,  and 
without  a  force  fufficient  to  protedt,  or  pro- 
vifions  to  fupport  them,  invited  by  procla- 
mation, the  Loyalifts  to  join  him,  and  after- 
wards found  it  neceiTary  to  quit  the  friendly 
diftrids  of  that    province,  before   he   could 
have  time  to  give  them   a  fair   trial,  I  am 
perfuaded  your    Lordlhip  will   acknowledge 

he 


(  40  ) 
he  did  not  ad  under  my  inftrud^lions : — 
nor  were  his  Lordlliip's  retreat  to  VVihning- 
ton,  and  fubfequent  move  from  thence  to 
Virginia,  in  confequence  of  my  orders:  on 
the  contrary,  as  I  forefaw  all  the  unhappy 
confequences  of  them,  I  fliould  certainly 
have  endeavoured  to  have  ftopt  him,  could 
I  have  known  his  intentions  in  proper  time. 
But  though  his  Lordfliip's  movements, 
(which  it  mull  be  confelfed  have  been  as 
rapid  as  your  Lordfliip  expe<fted)  have  not  to 
my  fincere  concern  been  fuccefsfuUy  decilive ; 
I  am  convinced  he  is,  as  I  hope  we  all  are, 
impreffed  with  the  abfolute  neceffity  of  vigor- 
ous exertions  in  the  fervice  of  his  country  at 
the  prefent  crifis.  If  mine,  however,  have 
not  been  equal  to  my  inclinations,  I  have 
little  doubt  they  will  be  found  to  be  at  leaft 
equal  to  my  powers. 

"I  lliall  now,  my  Lord,  beg  leave  to  con- 
clude with  the  ftrongeft  alfurances,  that  no 
man  can  be  more  fervently  deiirous  than  I 

am 


I 

I 


I 


i 

If 


(  41  ) 
am  to  fee  an  honourable  end  put  to  this 
moll  burthenfome  war.  And  if  I  remain  in 
the  command,  that  no  endeavours  of  mine 
fliall  be  wanting  to  execute,  in  the  fullefl 
manner,  the  King's  pleafure  and  commands. 
Of  the  10,000  men  I  foHcited,  only  4000 
were  even  promifed;  and  no  portion  of 
thefe,  except  a  few  recruits,  has  yet  joined 
this  part  of  the  army.  Your  Lordfliip's 
lafl:  letters,  however,  give  me  hopes,  that 
three  Britifli  battalions  and  two  thoufand 
fix  hundred  German  troops  may  be  immedi- 
ately expedled.  If  all  thefe  arrive,  I  lliall 
then  be  able,  at  a  proper  feafon  to  reinforce 
the  Chefapeak  corps  very  conliderably ;  and 
if  a  reinforcement  does  not  likewife  come 
to  the  French  armament  already  here,  fuch 
operations  may  be  carried  on  as  may  perhaps 
produce  fome  advantages  in  the  courfe  of 
the  Winter.  But  if  our  reinforcement  does 
not  arrive,  and  the   French  fliould  receive 

theirs. 


■1 

i 


(  42   ) 

theirs,  I  think  we  lliall  have  every  thing  to 
apprehend. 

Before  I  clofe,  however,  I  beg  leave  to  fay 
a  word  or  two  in  explanation  of  two  obfer- 
vations,  in  the  Commiirioners  of  Accounts 
Seventh  Report;  in  order  to  obviate  any  im- 
plied cenfure,  they  may  be  fuppofed  to  point 
againft  me  as  Commander  in  Chief  of  the 
army  in  North  America. 

The  Commiflioners  are  pleafed  to  fay, 
"It  appears  that  the  number  of  the  forces 
"decreafed  every  year,  from  1778,  but  the 
"ilfue  for  the  extraordinary  fervices  of  that 
"army  greatly  encreafed,  during  the  fame 
"period." 

And  again,  "In  the  account  of  the  ilfues 
"to  the  officers  in  the  four  departments, 
"we  find  that  the  warrants  ifllied  to  the 
"(;^arter-mafter's-general,  fince  the  i6th 
"July  1780,  and  to  the  Barrack-mafter'' - 
"general  fince  the  29th  June  1780,  and  to 
"the  Commilliiries-general,  fince   the  25th 

"of 


i 


c 

s 
I 

t 


of 


(  43  ) 
"of  May  1778,  have  been  all  temporary,  for 
"  funis  on  account ;  and  that  no  final  warrant 
"has  been  granted  fince  thofe  feveral  periods. 
"So  that  thefe  fums  have  been  ilTued,  with- 
"out  even  the  ceremony  of  a  quarterly 
"abftra6t,  and  the  confidential  reliance  on 
"the  officer,  that  his  vouchers  are  forth 
"coming." 

I  arrived  in  London  many  days  before  the 
Commiffioners  of  Accounts  delivered  in  their 
Seventh  Report  to  the  House  of  Commons. 
Had  thofe  Gentlemen   called   upon  me,  as 
they  did  on  Sir  William  Howe,  and  Lord 
Cornwallis;  had  they  examined  certain  offi- 
cers of  the  difl^srent  departments,  who  arrived 
in  England  at  the  time  I  did,  and  who  an- 
nounced themfelves  to  them ;  and  had  they 
read  all  the  Reports  of  the  different  Boards 
of  General    Officers    and    Magiftrates,   that 
had  been  appointed  by  me  at  New  York,  to 
enquire  into  the  expenditure  of  public  mo- 
ney, (all  which  reports  had  been  fent  to  the 

Lords 


(     44     ) 


)f  the  Treafi 


iry 


man> 


Lords  Commillioners 

months  before)  I  am  perluaded  that  their 
Report  would  not  have  appeared  on  the 
table  of  the  Houfe  of  Commons  in  the  fliape 
it  has  done.  For  when  they  were  informed 
(as  they  would  have  been  by  the  means  juft 
ftated)  that  all  the  rum  purchafed  for  the 
fupply  of  the  army  during  the  whole  period 
of  my  command,  was  paid  for  in  America 
by  my  warrants,  whereas  before  then  it  ufed 
to  be  paid  for  in  England;  that  confiderable 
fums  of  money  were  paid  on  my  warrants 
for  expences  incurred  during  the  command 
of  my  predecelfor,  which  could  not  be  brought 
to  account  fooner;  that  provifions  to  a  very 
confiderable  amount  were  purchafed  in  Ame- 
rica, and  paid  for  in  America  on  my  war- 
rants, for  the  fupply  of  the  army,  which 
might  otherwife  have  been  expofed  to  the 
greateft  diftrefs;  all  which  together  amount- 
ed to  nearly  1,500,0001.  and  that  the  in- 
creafe   of  ports,    during    my    command,    at 

Savannah, 


(     45      > 
Savannah,  Charles  Town,  Cape  Fear,  Portf- 
mouth,  Penoblcot,  &c.  requiring  each  their 
relpeaive  eiVabHlliments,  added  of  courle  to 
the  extraordinaries  of  my  army;  and  that, 
hefides    thefe,    and    many    others    which    I 
could  enumerate,  the  peculiar  circumftances 
of  my  command  expofed  me  to  many  ex- 
pences   unknown    to   my  predeceifor;    it    is 
prefumed,  thofe  Gentlemen  would  have  ad- 
mitted, that  the   increafe  of  the   ilTues  for 
the  extraordinary  fervices  of  the  army  un- 
der    my    command,    was     accounted    tor. 
This    matter,    however,    went,    by    my    de- 
fire,  through  a  very  full  and  formal  invefti- 
gation,  in  Auguft   1781,  before   a   iJoard  ot 
general  officers  and    magiftrates  (of  which 
Lieutenant-general  Robertfon  was  Prefident) 
under  the  title  of  a  Comparative  View  of 
Expences  incurred,  from  the  3 1  ft  December, 
1775,  to  the   1 6th  of  May,  1778  (the  time 
of  Sir  William   Howe's  command)   and  of 
what  was  paid  by  me,  between  the  26th  of 

May 


ii 


(  46  ) 

May  1778,  and  the  31ft  of  December  1780. 
Which  produced  the  following  report  from 
that  Board. 

"The  great  national  expence  in  the 
"firft  period  of  Sir  William  Howe's  com- 
"mand,  arofe  from  the  whole  navy,  and 
"a  very  numerous  fleet  of  tranfports,  be- 
"ing  employed  in  attending  the  move- 
"ments  of  the  army;  no  part  of  which 
"appears  in  Sir  William  Howe's  war- 
"  rants. 

"The  expence  of  the  (^larter-mafter- 
"  general,  Barrack-mafter-general,  and  En- 
"gineer  departments,  were  necelfarily  fmall, 
"while  the  troops  were  on  board  fliips,  or 
"had  thus  fupplies  from  tranfports. 

"  During  part  of  the  firft  period,  the 
"great  article  of  expence,  r«w,  was  pro- 
"vided  for  by  a  contrad:  made  in  Eng- 
"land,  and  paid  for  there.  Whereas,  du- 
"ring  the  fecond  period,  the  rum  was  pur- 
chafed 


(  47  ). 
"chafed  by  the  Commiiraiy-general,  and 
"paid  for  by  the  Commander  in  Chief's 
"warrants.  A  very  large  quantity  of  pro- 
"vifions  purchafed  alfo,  during  the  latter 
"period,  fwells  the  amount  of  the  war- 
"  rants. 

"But  what  deftroys  a  poffibility  of  draw- 
"ing  any  juft  conclufion  from  a  comparifon 
"of  the  amount  of  the  warrants  in  thefe 
"two  periods,  arifes  from  this;  that  a  great 
"part  of  the  expence  incurred  by  Sir  Wil- 
"liam  Howe,  was  paid  by  warrants  granted 
"by  Sir  Henry  Clinton." 

This  report  having  been  regularly  tranf- 
mitted  to  the  Treafury,  I  muft  fuppofe  it 
was  laid  before  the  Commiffioners  of  Ac- 
counts. Had  it  been  read  by  thofe  Gentle- 
men, it  is  prefumable  it  would  have,  at  leaft, 
accompanied  theirs. 

With  regard  to  the  fecond  obfervation 
alluded  to,  refpedting  my  not  granting  final 
warrants  to  certain  departments  from  certain 

periods ; 


(  48  ) 
periods ;  if  the  commilTioners  had  read  all  the 
above  papers,  I  think  it  would  have  occurred 
to  them;  that  as  a  Commiiraiy  of  Accounts 
had  been  commillioned,  and  was  adlually 
employed  in  auditing  the  accounts  of  the 
different  departments,  I  could  not,  with 
propriety,  grant  final  warrants  to  any  of  the 
departments  upon  their  quarterly  abftradls 
(as  had  been  before  prad:ifed)  untill  their 
accounts  had  been  firft  audited  and  certified 
by  the  Commiflary. 

As  to  the  mode  of  fupply  which  I  found 
eftablifhed,  when  I  fucceeded  to  the  com- 
mand of  the  army  in  North  America,  and 
which  I  underflood  had  been  approved  by 
Government,  I  certainly  could  not,  in  pru- 
dence, have  made  any  alterations  or  reduc- 
tion in  it,  as  long  as  I  had  offenfive  opera- 
tion in  view.  The  inftant,  however,  that 
I  received  orders  to  place  the  army  upon  a 
ftri(5l  defenfive,  I  propofed  fuch  a  reduftion 
as  could  take  place.     And  when   I   obtained 


le 

;d 

Its 

ily 

he 

Xh 

he 

as 

eir 
ied 


(     49     ) 
his  Majelly's  permiflion  to  refign  the  com- 
mand, I   recommended  it   to   General   Ro- 
hertfon,    who    was    appointed    to    fucceed 
me. 


(Signed) 


"H.     CLINTON." 


ind 
inl- 
and 
by 
)ru- 
luc- 
era- 
that 
jn  a 
ition 
ined 


APPENDIX. 


lis 


i  I 


It)  U' 


(     5^     ) 


APPENDIX. 


NUMBER       I. 


Extras  of  a  Letter  from  Lord  George  Ger- 
main to  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  dated  May 
2,  1 78 1. 

"Conceiving  therefore  Ib  highly  as 
I  do  of  the  importance  of  the  Southern  pro- 
vinces, and  of  the  vaft  advantages  which  mull: 
attend  the  profecution  of  the  war  upon  the 
prefent  plan  of  extending  our  conquefts  from 
fouth  to  north ;  it  was  a  great  mortification 
to  me  to  find,  by  your  inftrudion  to  Major- 
General  Phillips,  that  it  appeared  to  be  your 
intention  that  only  a  part  of  the  troops  he 
carried  with  him  Ihould  remain  in  the  Chefa- 

peak ; 


'r' 


5^ 


A  P  P  E  N  1)  1  X. 


peak ;  and  that  he  and  General  Arnold 
fliould  return  to  New  York,  leaving  only  a 
fufficient  force  to  ferve  for  garrifons  in  the 
ports  they  might  eftablifli  in  Virginia.  Your 
ideas,  therefore,  of  the  importance  of  reco- 
vering that  province  appearing  to  be  fo  dif- 
ferent from  mine,  I  thought  it  proper  to  afk 
the  advice  of  his  Majefty's  other  fervants 
upon  the  fubjed:;  and  their  opinions  concur- 
ring entirely  with  mine,  it  has  been  fubmit- 
ted  to  the  King;  and  I  am  commanded  by 
his  Majefty  to  acquaint  you  that  the  reco- 
very of  the  Southern  Provinces  and  the  pro- 
fecution  of  the  war,  by  purtiing  our  conquefts 
from  fouth  to  north,  is  to  be  conlidered  as 
the  chief  and  principal  objedl  for  the  em- 
ployment of  all  the  forces  under  your  com- 
mand, which  can  be  fpared  from  the  defence 
of  the  places  in  his  Majefty's  polfeffion,  until 
it  is  accompliflied. 

"The  three  regiments  from  Ireland,  and 
the  Britidi  recruits  that  went  with  them,  are, 

I  truft, 


APPENDIX. 


5J 


y 
I- 

»- 

ts 
as 
1- 
1- 
:e 
til 


I  trull,  well  on  their  way  by  this  time  to 
Charles  Town ;  and  as  Sir  George  Rodney 
will  bring  you  three  more  regiments  from 
the  Leeward  Iflands  before  the  hurricane 
months,  the  augmentation  of  your  force 
muft,  I  fliould  think,  be  equal  to  the  utmoft 
of  your  willies. 

NUMBER    II. 

ExtraB  of  a  Letter  from  Lord  George  Ger- 
main  to  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  dated  fiine  6, 
1781. 

"  I  SHALL  therefore  only  obferve  in  ad- 
dition to  all  I  have  hitherto  written  upon  the 
the  fubjed:,  that  I  am  well  pleafed  to  find 
Lord  Cornwallis's  opinion  entirely  coincides 
with  mine  of  the  great  importance  of  pulliing 
the  war  on  the  fide  of  Virginia  with  all  the 
force  that  can  be  fpared  until  that  province 
is  reduced." 


■e, 
It, 


NUMBER 


54 


A  I*  P  K  N  1)  1  X. 


NUMBER    III. 

Copy  of  a  Letter  from  Rear  Admiral  Sir 
S.  Hood  to  Sir  H.  Clifitofi,  dated  off  Cape 
Henry,  Augiijl  25,  1781. 

"S  I  R, 
"  HEREWITH  you  will  receive  a  dupli- 
cate of  the  letter  I  had  the  honour  to  write 
you  by  Lieut.  Delanoe  of  the  Adtive  brig,  in 
cafe  any  misfortune  fliould  have  befallen  her 
in  returning  to  New  York.  I  am  now 
fleering  for  Cape  Henry,  in  order  to  examine 
the  Chefapeak.  From  thence  I  rtiall  proceed 
to  the  Capes  of  the  Delaware ;  and  not  feeing, 
or  hearing  any  thing  of  De  Grafle,  or  any 
detachment  of  fliips  he  might  have  fent  upon 
this  coaft,  fliall  then  make  the  beft  of  my 
way  off  Sandy  Hook.  This  I  have  commu- 
nicated to  Rear  Admiral  Graves,  in  order 
that  he  may  determine  my  anchoring  or  not, 
as  the  King's  fervice  may  require. 


"I  have 


li- 
te 
in 
ler 

ine 
;ed 

any 

pon 

my 

nu- 

rder 

not, 

have 


APPENDIX.  55 

"  I  have  the  honour  to  fend  you  my  hne 
of  battle,  by  which  you  will  fee  the  number 
and  force  of  his  Majefty's  fquadron  under  my 
command;  and,  I  truft,  you  will  think  it 
equal,  fully  to  defeat  any  defigns  of  the  ene- 
my, let  De  Gralfe  bring  or  fend  what  (hips 
he  may,  in  aid  to  thofe  under  De  Barras. 

"  I  have  the  honour  to  be,  6cc. 


(Signed) 


"SAM.  HOOD." 


NUMBER    IV. 

Copy  of  a  Letter  from  General  Wajlmigton  to 
Count  De  Graje,  dated  WilUamJhurg,  Sep- 
tember 26,  1 78 1. 

"  I  AM  unable  to  defcribe  to  your  Excel- 
lency the  painful  anxiety  under  which  I  have 
laboured  fince  the  reception  of  the  letter  you 
did  me  the  honour  to  write  me  of  the  23d 
inftant.  The  motions  of  the  naval  force  under 
your  command,  which  your  Excellency  fays 
may  pollibly  happen,  fmce  the  information 

communicated 


5^,  A  P  P  v.  N   I)   I   X. 

communicated  to  you  by  the  Baron  de 
Clozen,  obliges  me  to  point  out  the  confe- 
quences  that  may  follow;  and  warmly  to 
urge  a  perleverance  in  the  plan  agreed  upon 
between  us.  Permit  me,  in  the  fir  ft  place,  to 
repeat  to  your  Excellency,  that  the  attempt 
upon  York,  under  the  protedlion  of  your 
fliipping,  is  as  certain  of  fuccefs  as  a  fuperior 
force  and  a  fuperiority  of  meafures  can  render 
any  military  operation;  that  the  duration  of 
the  fiege  may  be  exadlly  afcertained ;  and  that 
the  capture  of  the  Britifli  army  is  a  matter  fo 
important  in  itself,  and  in  its  confequences, 
that  it  muft  greatly  tend  to  bring  an  end  to  the 
war,  and  put  our  allied  arms  in  certain  poflef- 
fion  of  the  moft  ineftimable  advantages. 

"  If  your  Excellency  quits  the  Bay,  an  ac- 
cefs  is  open  to  relieve  York,  of  which  the 
enemy  will  inftantly  avail  themselves.  The 
confequences  of  this  will  be  not  only  the  dif- 
grace  of  abandoning  a  defign  on  which  are 
founded  the  faireft  hopes  of  the  allied  forces, 

after 


A  V  P  K  N  D  1  X.  57 

after  a  prodigious  expence,  fatigue,  and  exer- 
tions; but  the  probable  difbanding  of  tl^  e 
whole  army;  for  the  prefent  feat  of  war  be- 
ing fuch,  as  abfolutely  precludes  the  ufe  of 
waggons,  from  the  great  number  of  large 
rivers  which  interfed  the  country,  there  will 
be  a  total  want  of  provifions,  unlefs  this  in- 
convenience is  remedied  by  water  carriage. 
This  province  has  been  fo  exhaufted  by  the 
ravages  of  the  enemy,  and  by  the  support 
already  given  to  our  forces,  that  fubfiftence 
muft  be  drawn  from  a  diftance,  and  that  can 
be  done  only  by  a  fleet  fuperior  in  the  Bay. 

"I  earneftly  beg  your  Excellency  would 
conlider,  that  if,  by  moving  your  fleet  from 
the  fituation  agreed  on,  we  lofe  the  prefent 
opportunity,  we  fliall  never  hereafter  have  it 
in  our  power  to  ftrike  fo  decifive  a  ftroke, 
that  the  Britifli  will  labour  without  intermif- 
fion  to  fortify  a  place  fo  ufeful  to  their  (liip- 
ping;  and  that  then  the  period  of  an  honoura- 
ble peace  will  be  farther  diftant  than  ever, 
H  "The 


:il 


5« 


A   I*  V  K  N  D  I  X. 


"The  confidence  I  have  in  your  Excellen- 
cy's manly  fpirit  and  naval  talents  leaves  me 
no  doubt  that  the  confideration  of  the  confe- 
quences  that  mull:  follow  your  departure  from 
the  Bay  will  determine  you  to  ufe  all  pollible 
means  for  the  good  of  the  common  caufe. 
From  the  alfurances  of  the  moft  expert  failors, 
I  am  perfuaded  that  your  Excellency  may 
take  fuch  a  pofition  in  the  Bay  as  to  leave  no- 
thing to  he  apprehended  from  an  attempt  of 
the  Englirti  fleet;  that  this  pofition  will  at  the 
fame  time  facilitate  the  operations  of  the  fiege, 
fecure  the  tranfportation  of  our  provifions  by 
water,  and  accellerate  our  approaches  by  land- 
ing our  heavy  artillery  and  warlike  necelfaries 
in  York  River  almoll  clofe  to  our  trenches. 

"  The  force  faid  to  have  arrived  under  Ad- 
miral Digby,  as  the  news  comes  from  the  Bri- 
tifli  themselves,  may  not  only  be  exaggera- 
ted, but  perhaps  abfolutely  falfe;  but  fuppo- 
fing  it  to  be  true,  their  whole  force  united 
cannot  be  fuch  as  to  give  them  any  hopes  ■ 

f' 


I 


A  V  V  K  N   1)  I  X.  59 

fuccels  in  the  attacking  your  fleet.  If  the 
pofition  for  your  (hips  to  lie  at  an  anchor, 
which  we  agreed  upon,  has  fmce  appeared 
imprad:icahle,  there  is  IHU  another  meafure 
may  he  adopted;  which,  though  much  in- 
ferior as  to  the  fecurity  and  facility  it  will 
give  to  our  land  operations,  may  ftill  he  of 
advantage  to  our  affairs.  The  meafure,  I 
mean,  is  to  cruife  off  the  Bay,  fo  as  to  keep 
the  Capes  ahvays  in  fight,  and  to  prevent  any 
Englifli  veffels  getting  in. 

"Whatever  plan  you  may  adopt,  I  am  to 
prefs  your  Excellency  to  perfevere  in  the 
fcheme  fo  happily  concerted  between  us ;  hut 
if  you  fliould  find  infurmountable  obftacles 
in  the  way,  let  me  ultimately  beg  of  you  not 
to  relinquifli  the  laft  mentioned  alternative 
of  preventing  all  veffels  from  the  enemy 
entering  the  Bay  of  Chesapeak. 

"The  Britifli  Admiral  may  manoeuvre 
his  fleet,  and  endeav  ur  to  draw  you  from 
the  main  objedt  we  have  in  view;  but  I  can 

never 


6o 


APPENDIX. 


never  believe,  that  he  will  ferioufly  wifli  to 
bring  on  a  general  a(flion  with  a  fleet,  whofe 
force,  I  will  anfwer  for  it,  is  fuperior  to  the 
moft  exaggerated  accounts  we  have  of  theirs. 
Palfed  experience  has  taught  them  not  to 
hazard  themfelves  with  equal  numbers;  and 
has  drawn  from  them,  though  unwillingly, 
the  moft  refpeftful  opinions  of  their  enemy. 

"Permit  me  to  add  that  the  abfence  of 
your  fleet  from  the  Bay  may  fruftrate  our  de- 
iign  upon  the  garrifon  at  York.  For  in  the 
prefent  lituation  of  matters,  Lord  Cornwallis 
might  evacuate  the  place  with  the  loss  of  his 
artillery,  baggage,  and  a  few  men,  facrifices; 
which  would  be  highly  juftifiable  from  the 
delire  of  faving  the  body  of  the  armv. 

"The  Marquis  de  la  Fayette,  who  does 
me  the  honour  to  carry  this  letter  to  your 
Excellency,  will  explain  to  you  better  than 
any  other  perfon,  or  than  I  can  do  by  letter, 


many  part 


rticulars  of  ( 
Excellency  is  acquainte 


prefent  poiition.  Your 
d  with  his  candour  and 
talents. 


A  P  P  E  N   D  I  X.  6i 

talents,  which  entitles  him  to  your  confidence 
I  have  ordered  him  not  to  pafs  the  Cape  tor 
fear  of  accident,  in  cafe  you  fhould  be  at  fea. 
If  this  be  fo,  he  will  inclofe  this  difpatch  in 
a  letter  from  himself, 

"I  have  the  honour,  &c. 

"G.  WASHINGTON;' 


NUMBER    V. 

ExtraSt  from    Lord   George    Germain  s   Let- 
ter to  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  dated  OBober  1 2, 

1781. 

"  IT  is  a  great  latisfaftion  to  me  to  find 
your  ideas  of  the  importance  of  fecuring  a 
naval  ftation  in  the  Chefapeak  capable  of 
giving  proteaion  to  the  King's  fhips,  ap- 
pointed to  intercept  the  navigation  of  that 
Bay,  fo  entirely  coincided  with  my  own ;  and 
that  the  plan  you  had  concerted  for  con- 
duaing  the  military  operations  in  that  quarter 

correfponds 


62 


APPENDIX. 


• '  ^■^ 


correfponds  with  what  I  had  fuggefted  in  my 
former  letters  to  you  on  that  fubjed.  I  truft, 
therefore  that  Lord  CornwalHs  will  retain  the 
whole  of  the  troops  you  fo  very  properly 
fpared  for  the  fervice  in  the  Chelapeak:  or 
if  he  has  fent  you  any  part,  that  you  will  re- 
turn them  to  him.  And  as  foon  as  the  heats 
are  abated,  tranfport  a  ftrong  detachment  to 
Baltimore,  Sec. 

"The  provifion  you  made  for  the  fouthern 
fervice  was  certainly  moil  ample.  And  I  have 
always  confidered  and  fpoke  of  it  as  a  circum- 
ftance  highly  to  your  honour;  and  as  an  evi- 
dence of  your  being  adtuated  by  the  pureft 
zeal  for  the  public  fervice.  And  though  I 
lament  exceedingly  that  from  a  concurrence 
of  untoward  events,  the  fuccefs  was  not  equal 
to  the  fanguine  expedations  I  had  enter- 
tained, I  never  imputed  any  part  of  the  difap- 
pointment  to  a  deticiency  in  your  fupplies." 


NUM- 


A  P  P  E  N  D  1  X. 


63 


NUMB  E  R    VI. 

ExtraB  from  Sir  Henry  Clintoiis  Letter  to 
Rear- Admiral  Graves,  dated  Auguji  16, 
1781. 

"  I  CANNOT  fay  I  credit  the  reports  of 
the  French  being  upon  the  coait.  Should 
they  prove  falfe,  and  there  was  Httle  probabi- 
lity of  their  coming  for  a  week  or  ten  days, 
I  think  thofe  could  not  be  better  employed 
than  in  a  vifit  to  Rhode-Ilk.id.  The  recruits 
I  have  lately  received  enable  me  to  make  this 
offer,  whenever  you  think  it  prudent  to  at- 
tempt it.  If  you  determine,  I  requeft  that 
Captain  Duncan  may  diredt  the  water-move- 
ments of  the  army." 


ExtraH  from  Sir  Henry  Clititons  Letter  to 
Rear- Admiral  Graves,  dated  ylugujl  18, 
1781. 

"WHENEVER,  Sir,  you  think  the  Heet 
under  your  command  is  in  number  and  (late 

equal 


.1    ; 


•    I 


64 


A  P  P  E  N   D  I  X. 


equal  to  the  undertaking,  and  you  will  give 
me  twenty-four  hours  notice,  every  thing 
(hall  be  immediately  embarked;  and  I  fliall 
with  plealure  accompany  you  myself  on  it." 


NUMBER    VII. 

Extracts  from  Rear- Admiral  Graves's  Letters 
to  Sir  H.  ClititoH,  dated  18  and  21  Augiiji, 
1781. 

"IN  anfwer  to  your  propofition,  I  can 
only  alTure  you  by  letter,  what  I  had  the  ho- 
nour to  declare  in  perfon,  that  I  am  ready  to 
concur  with  your  Excellency  in  any  enter- 
prize  where  you  found  a  probability  of  fuc- 
cefs;  and  that  I  would  rilk  the  fquadron 
whenever  you  thought  it  advifeable  to  rilk 

the  army. 

"  The  Robufte  is  fo  leaky,  I  am  forced  to 
fend  her  to  the  yard  for  reparation;  and  I 
fufped:  that  her  guns  and  heavy  furniture 
muft  be  t.  ken  out  to  enable  the  (hipwrights 

to 


APPENDIX. 


65 


to  examine  as  much  of  her  bottom  as  poflible. 
Whilft  that  is  doing,  the  Prudent  will  change 
one  of  her  malts,  if  not  two.  By  this  ftate 
you  will  fee  our  naval  capacity.  21  Auguft, 
1 78 1.  How  foon  the  Robufte  will  be  ready 
is  yet  impoflible  to  form  a  judgement  upon, 
as  we  cannot  yet  learn  the  extent  of  her  de- 
feats. The  Prudent  will,  I  am  confident,  be 
ready  in  much  lefs  time;  and  fo  will  all  the 
other  fliips,  I  have  not  a  doubt. 

"Your  Excellency  may  reft  afliired  that 
timely  notice  fliall  be  given,  and  as  early  as 
pollible  to  determine  upon  the  day  the  fqu  '- 
dron  will  be  fit  to  a6l;  for  I  would  not  v  ifli 
that  a  fingle  day  fliould  be  loft." 


NUMBER     VIII. 

Extract  from  Lord  CormvaUis  s  Letter  to  Sir 
H.  Clinton.  York  Toicny  Virginia^  20  Oc- 
tober, 1 78 1. 

"  I    HAVE   the   mortification   to   inform 

your  Excellency,  that  I  have  been  forced  to 

I  give 


:  ' 


ill 


( 


I 


66  A  P   1*   K  N   D   I   X. 

give  up  the  ports  of  York  and  (Jloucefter, 
and  to  riirrendei-  the  troops  under  my  com- 
mand, hy  capitulation,  on  the  19th  inrtant, 
as  prifoners  of  war  to  the  comhined  forces 
of  America  and  France. 

"I    never  iaw   this  poft   in   a   Hivourahle 
hght.     But,  when  I  found  I  was  to  be  at- 
tacked in  it,  in  fo  unprepared  a  ftate,  by  fo 
powerful  an  army  and  artillery,  nothing  but 
the  hopes  of  relief  would  have  induced  me  to 
attempt   its   defence.      For   I   would   either 
have  endeavoured  to  efcape  to  New  York,  by 
rapid  marches  from  the  Gloucefter  fide,  im- 
mediately on  the  arrival  of  General  Wailiing- 
ton's  troops  at  Williamlburg ;  or  I  would, 
notwithftanding    the  difparity  of   numbers, 
have  attacked  them  in  the  open  field,  where 
it  might  have  been  just  pofiible  that  Fortune 
would  have  favoured  the  gallantry  of  the  hand- 
ful of  troops  under  my  command.    But,  being 
ailured  by  your  Excellency's  letters  that  every 
poflible  means  would  be  tried,  by  the  navy 

and 


\ 


I 


-r, 
li- 
lt, 

;es 

5le 

it- 
fo 

)Ut 

to 
ler 
by 
ni- 

ild, 
ers, 
ere 
une 
nd- 
ing 
'ery 
avy 
and 


\ 


APPENDIX.  67 

and  army,  to  relieve  us,  I  could  not  think 
myfelf  at  liberty  to  venture  on  either  of  thole 
defperate  attempts.  Therefore,  after  remain- 
ing two  days  in  a  ftrong  pofition,  in  front 
of  this  place,  in  hopes  of  being  attacked, 
upon  obferving  that  the  enemy  were  taking 
meafures  which  could  not  fail  of  turning  my 
left  flank  in  a  fliort  time;  and  receiving,  the 
fecond  evening,  your  letter  of  the  24th  Sep- 
tember, informing  me  that  the  relief  would 
lail  about  the  5th  of  Odober,  I  withdrew 
within  the  works  on  the  night  of  the  29th  of 
September,  hoping,  by  the  labour  and  firm- 
nefs  of  the  troops,  to  protrad:  the  defence  un- 
til you  could  arrive.  Every  thing  was  to  be 
expeded  from  the  firmnefs  of  the  troops. 
But  every  difadvantage  attended  their  labour; 
as  the  works  were  to  be  continued  under  the 
enemy's  fire;  and  our  ftock  of  intrenching- 
tools,  which  did  not  much  exceed  four  hun- 
dred when  we  began  to  work  in  the  latter 
end  of  Auguft,  was  now  much  diminillied. 

"A 


i  • 


68  APPENDIX. 

"A  fuccefsful  defence,  however,  in  our 
fituation,  was  perhaps  impoffible;  for  the 
place  could  only  be  reckoned  an  intrenched 
camp,  fubjea  in  moft  places  to  enfilade;  and 
the  ground  in  general  fo  difadvantageous, 
that  nothing  but  the  neceffity  of  fortifying  it 
as  a  port  to  protect  the  navy  could  have  in- 
duced any  perfon  to  ereft  works  upon  it." 


Copy  of  a  Letter  from  Sir  Henry  Clinton  to 
Earl  Cornivallis,  dated  30  November,  1781. 

[This  letter  was  not  produced  in  the  House  of  Lords.] 

"  My  Lord, 
"AFTER  the  converfation  I  had  with 
your  LordHiip  before  I  fent  your  letter  to  be 
publiOied,  in  which  we  feemed  fo  perfeftly 
to  agree,  I  muft  beg  your  Lorddiip's  pardon 
for  again  troubling  you  on  the  fubjed.  But, 
being  informed,  perhaps  officioufiy,  that  fome 
people  here  fuppofe  there  are  paflages  in  that 

letter 


APPENDIX.  69 

letter  which  convey  an  idea  that  you  had 
been  compelled  by  my  orders  to  take  the 
port  of  York,  (though  it  was  not  your  own 
preference;)  that  you  had  reprefented  the 
defedts  of  the  ground;  and  were  detained 
there  contrary  to  your  own  judgement; — and 
likewife  that  I  had  promifed  the  exertions 
of  the  navy  before  my  letter  of  the  24th  of 
September:  I  am  perfuaded  your  Lordfhip 
will  readily  excufe  my  requefting  a  more 
formal  avowal  of  your  fentiments,  left  I 
fliould  have  then  miftaken  them.  Becaufe, 
if  that  (hould  unfortunately  be  the  case,  I 
may  perhaps  be  under  the  neceffity  of  taking 
meafures  to  obviate  your  letter  being  viewed 
in  the  fame  light  in  England. 

"  I  have  the  honour,  &c. 


"H.  CLINTON." 


70 


A  P  V  E  N   D  I  X. 


NUMBER     IX. 

Copy  of  Earl  ConncaUis  s  Letter  to  Sir  Henry 
Clinton,  dated  Neiv  York,  ^^  December, 
1781. 

[This  letter  was  read  in  the  House  of  Lords.] 

"SIR, 

"YESTERDAY  afternoon  I  was  ho- 
noured with  your  Excellency's  letter  of  the 
30th  of  November. 

"  I  do  not  recoUeft  that  any  converlation 
palled  between  us  the  other  day,  before  the 
publication  of  my  letter,  relative  to  my  rea- 
fons  for  taking  polfeffion  of  the  ports  of  York 
and  Gloucefter.     But,  in  my  anfwers  to  your 
difpatches,  dated  the  8th  and  nth  of  July, 
diredting  me  fo  pofitively  to  polTefs  a  harbour 
in  the  Chelapeak  for  line  of  battle  (hips,  your 
Excellency  will  fee,  that,  after  finding  that 
works  on  Point  Comfort  could  not  protett  a 

naval 


APPENDIX.  71 

naval  force  in  Hampton  Road,  I  thought  that 
I  a.d\cd  in  i\r\t\  obedience  to  your  orders  by 
taking  poUellion  of  thole  ports.  I  thought  it 
unneceiHiry  to  enter  into  a  minute  detail  of 
the  difadvantages  of  the  ground,  either  on  my 
firft  examination  of  it  in  the  month  of  June, 
or  on  my  return  to  it  in  Auguft;  becaufe,  on 
the  firft  occafion,  as  I  have  already  had  the 
honour  of  explaining  to  your  Excellency,  I 
did  not,  after  feeing  it,  entertain  for  a  moment 
an  idea  of  occupying  it,  not  thinking  myfelf 
at  liberty,  by  the  inftrudions  under  which  I 
then  aded,  to  detain  the  greater  part  of  the 
force  in  Virginia  for  the  purpofe  of  fecuring  a 
harbour  for  fliips  of  the  line ;  and,  on  my  re- 
turn to  it  in  Auguft,  I  thought  it  then  became 
my  duty  to  make  the  beft  of  it  I  could,  having 
no  other  harbour  to  propofe  in  its  place. 

"In  regard  to  the  promife  of  the  exertions 
of  the  navy  previous  to  your  letter  of  the  24th 
of  September,  I  can  only  repeat  what  I  had 

the 


72 


APPENDIX. 


the  honour  of  laying  to  your  Excellency  in 
the  converfation  to  which  you  allude;  that, 
without  any  particular  engagement  for  the 
navy  before  that  date,  all  your  letters  held  out 
uniformly  hopes  of  relief;  and  that  I  had  no 
reafon,  from  any  of  them,  to  fuppofe  that  you 
had  loft  fight  of  the  pofiibility  of  effeding  it. 
And  that,  under  thofe  hopes,  after  serious  re- 
flection, I  did  not  think  that  it  would  have 
been  justifiable  in  me  to  abandon  thofe  ports, 
with  our  numerous  fick,  artillery,  ftores,  and 
fliipping;  or  to  rifk  an  adHon,  which,  in  all 
probability,  would  in  its  confequences  have 
precipitated  the  lofs  of  them. 

"My  letter  from  York,  dated  the  20th  of 
Oftober,  was  written  under  great  agitation  of 
mind  and  in  great  hurry,  being  conftantly  in- 
terrupted by  numbers  of  people  coming  upon 
bufinefs  or  ceremony.  But  my  intention  in 
writing  that  letter  was  to  explain  the  motives 
that  influenced  my  own  condudt,  and  to  nar- 
rate 


A  P  P  E  N  D  I  X. 


7.1 


rate  the  incidents  that  preceded  the  extremity 
that  forced  us  to  lurrender. 

"  I  have  the  honour,  Sec. 

"  CORNWALLIS.  " 


NUMBER     IX. 

Copy  of  a  Letter  from  Sir  Henry  Clinton  to 
Earl  Cornivallis,  dated  New  York,  zd  and 
10///  December y  1781. 

[This  letter  was  not  read  in  the  House  of  Lords.] 

"  My  Lord, 

"  AS  your  Lordfliip  is  pleafed,  in  your 
letter  of  this  day,  to  revert  to  the  circumftance 
of  your  quitting  Williamftiurg  Neck  and  re- 
pairing the  James  River,  fo  contrary  to  the 
intentions  I  wiflied  to  exprefs  in  my  letters  of 
the  I  ith  and  1 5th  of  June,  and  thofe  referred 
to  by  them,  and  which  I  thought  they  would 
have  clearly  explained.  Your  Lordlhip  will,  I 
hope,  forgive  me,  if  I  once  more  repeat  that  I 


K 


am 


mmmm 


74 


APPENDIX. 


'  i 


am  of  opinion,  if  thofe  letters  had  been  proper- 
ly underftood  by  your  Lordlhip,  you  would 
at  leaft  have  hefitated  before  you  adopted  that 
meafure.  For  I  humbly  prefume  it  will  ap- 
pear, upon  a  re-perulal  of  them,  that  it  was 
my  delire  to  recommend  to  your  Lordfliip  the 
taking  a  healthy  defenfive  ftation,  either  at 
Williamflnirg  or  York;  and,  after  keeping 
what  troops  you  might  want  for  the  ample 
defence  of  fuch  a  poll,  and  defultory  move- 
ments by  water,  to  fend  me  fuch  a  proportion 
of  the  corps  (mentioned  in  a  lilf)  as  you  could 
fpare,  taking  them  in  the  fucceffion  they  are 
there  placed.  Your  Lordlliip,  on  the  con- 
trary, underrtood  thefe  as  conveying  a  politive 
order  to  fend  me  three  thoufand  men,  (by 
which  you  lay  your  force  would  have  been 
reduced  to  about  two  thoufand  four  hundred 
rank  and  file  tit  for  duty; — having,  it  is 
prelluned,  above  1500  lick;)  and  was  pleafed 
to  tell  me,  in  your  answer,  that  you  could  not, 
confident  with  my  plans,  make  fafe  defenlive 

polls 


A  i*  P  K  N  D  I  X. 


75 


d 
It 
)- 

IS 

le 
It 

'g 


)n 
Id 
re 
1-- 
ve 

tn 
id 
is 
^d 
>t, 
ve 
(Is 


ports  at  York  and  Gloucefter,  (both  of  which 
would  be  neceira'-y  for  the  protedlion  of  fliip- 
ping;)  and  that  you  fliould  immediately  re- 
pais  James  River,  and  take  meafures  for  com- 
plying with  my  requifition. 

"  I  own,  my  Lord,  that  my  opinion  of  the 
obvious  meaning  of  the  letters  referred  to, 
continues  ftill  the  fame ;  and  I  am  exceedingly 
iorry  to  find,  by  the  letter  you  have  now 
honoured  me  with,  that  it  differs  fo  widely 
from  your  Lordfliip's.  It  is  plain,  however, 
we  cannot  both  be  in  the  right. 

"My  letter  of  the  1 1  th  of  July  diredts  your 
Lorddiip  to  fortify  Old  Point  Comfort,  in 
the  mouth  of  James  River,  with  the  inten- 
tion of  fecuring  Hampton  Road,  which  the 
Admiral  recommended  as  the  beil  naval  fta- 
tion,  and  requeued  I  would  occupy.  But  your 
Lorddiip's  letter  of  the  27th  of  July  informs 
me,  you  had  examined  Old  Point  Comfort, 
with  the  officers  of  the  navy,  and  the  engi- 
neers, and  that  you  were  all  of  opinion,  a  poll 

there 


mmmm 


;:t 


76  A  P   l»  K  N    1)   1    X. 

there  would   not  anlwer  the   purpofe;   and 
that   you    fliould,  therefore,  in   compHance 
with  the  fpirit  of  my  orders,  feize  York  and 
Gloucefter,  heing  the  only  harhour  in  which 
you  could  hope  to  be  able  to  give  cjfeHual 
proteBion  to  line  of  battle  fliips.     Suppofing, 
therefore,  of  courfe,  that  your  Lordfliip  ap- 
proved, in  every  refpedt,  of  York  and  Glou- 
cefter,  from   the   preference   you   had   thus 
given  them  to  the  port  I  had  recommended, 
I  did  not  oppofe  the  choice  you  had  made; 
having   never  received  the   leaft    hint  from 
your  Lordlhip  that  the  ground  of  York  was 
unfiivourahle,    or  liable   to  be   enfiladed  till 
after  you  had  capitulated. 

"With  refpedl  to  your  Lordihip's  having 
been  influenced  in  your  conduct,  by  the  hopes 
of  relief,  (which  you  fay  was  uniformly  held 
out  to  you  in  all  my  letters)  you*-  Lordlhip 
cannot  be  infenfible,  that  the  poflibility  of 
efteding  it  muft  have  entirely  depended  upon 
the  exertions  of  the  navy;  which,  as  I  was 

not 


1 


A  P   l>  K  N   1)  I  X. 


77 


not  authoriled  to  promile  before  the  24th  of 
September,  I  am  perfuaded  your  Lordrtiip 
will  readily  acknowledge,  that  if  your  letter 
of  the  20th  Ocftober  implies  I  had  done  fo 
before  that  period,  the  implication  cannot 
be  fupported  by  any  thing  I  wrote  previous 
to  my  letter  of  that  date,  which  you  received 
on  the  29th. 

"As,  therefore,  my  letters  of  the  2d  and 
6th  of  September,  which  promife  only  my 
own  exertions,  did  not  reach  your  Lordrtiip 
before  the  13th  and  14th  of  that  month,  and 
you  did  not  before  then  know  of  Sir  Samuel 
Hood's  ai  rival,  or  of  Mr.  Graves's  having 
more  than  feven  lail  of  the  line  to  combat 
Monfieur  De  Gralfe's  force,  which  on  the 
29th  of  Auguft  you  had  heard  confided  of  at 
leaft  twenty-five  fail  of  the  line ;  your  Lord- 
fhip  confequently  could  have  no  hopes  of  re- 
lief before  that  time.  And  with  refpedt  to 
your  efcapc  to  New- York,  immediately  on 
the  arrival  of  General  Walliington's  troops  at 

Williamlburg, 


7« 


A  P  V  K  N  D  1  X. 


Williamlburg,  which  your  letter  of  the  20th 
of  October  implies  you  were  prevented  from 
undertaking,  by  the  receipt  of  mine  of  the 
24th  of  September;  I  muft  beg  leave  to  ob- 
ferve,  that  if  it  had  been  ever  pradicable 
after  the  time  your  Lordfliip  mentions  (which 
I  am  free  to  own  I  do  not  think  it  was)  it 
muft  have  been  between  that  period  and  the 
time  of  the  enemy's  force  appearing  before 
your  lines.  It  may,  therefore,  be  prefumed, 
you  could  not  have  been  prevented  by  any 
thing  I  fiiid  in  that  letter,  as  you  did  not  re- 
ceive it  until  after  the  latter  event  took  place. 
But  I  readily  admit,  my  Lord,  that  none  of 
my  letters  could  give  you  the  leaft  reafon  to 
fuppofe  that  an  attempt  would  not  be  made 
to  fuccour  you. 

"Your  Lordfhip  will,  I  am  perfuaded,  alfo 
forgive  me,  if  I  again  take  notice  of  the  too 
pofitive  manner  in  which  you  are  pleafed  to 
fpeak  t)f  the  opinion  I  gave  you  about  the 
failing  of  the  fleet ;  as  my  words  were,  "  there 


IS 


APPENDIX. 


79 


20th 

from 
'  the 
>  ob- 
;able 
hich 
as)  it 
Ithe 
efore 
med, 
'  any 
)t  re- 
)lace. 
ne  of 
on  to 
made 

I,  alfo 
e  too 
ed  to 
t  the 
there 
is 


*'  is  every  reafon  to  hope  we  fliall  ftart  from 
"hence  about  the  5th  of  Odober."  And  in 
my  letter  of  the  next  day,  for  fear  that  fliould 
appear  too  pofitive,  I  fay,  "It  is  fuppofed 
"the  neceffary  repairs  of  the  fleet  will  detain 
"us  here  to  the  5th  of  next  month;  and  your 
"Lordlhip  muft  be  fenfible  that  unforefeen 
"accidents  may  lengthen  it  out  a  day  or  two 
"longer." 

With  regard  to  entrenching  tools,  the  want 
of  which  your  Lordfhip  fo  much  complains 
of,  I  can  only  fay,  that  by  the  returns  made 
to  me  by  the  Adjutant-general,  it  appears  that 
two  thouland  five  hundred  had  been  fent  to  the 
Chefapeak  by  the  Engineer,  fince  General 
Arnold's  expedition,  inclufive;  and  that  the 
Hrft  moment  a  requifition  was  made  for  more, 
(which  was  not  before  the  23d  of  Augullj  I 
ordered  an  additional  fupply  to  be  fent,  which 
were  prevented  from  going,  by  the  arrival  of 
the  French  Heet.  I  own,  however,  that  I  was 
not  at  that  time  very  uneafy  on  this  fcore,  as 

I  fup- 


i.l 


80 


APPENDIX. 


I  fuppofed  it  poflible  for  your  Lordfliip  to 
have  colledted  a  fufficiency  from  the  neigh- 
bouring plantations  any  time  before  the  in- 
veftiture  was  begun, 

"December  10. 1  had  wrote  thus  far, 

my  Lord,  immediately  after  the  receipt  of  your 
Lordfliip's  letter  of  the  2d  inftant.  But  con- 
fidering  that  it  was  poffible  you  might  not 
have  adverted  to  the  implications,  which  your 
letter  of  the  20th  of  Od:ober  may  be  thought 
to  bear,  from  the  great  agitation  of  mind  and 
hurry  in  which  you  tell  me  it  was  written,  I 
was  unwilling  to  give  you  at  that  time  more 
trouble  on  the  fubjed:; — in  the  honeft  hope 
that  your  Lordfliip's  candour  will  induce  you 
mofl  formally  to  difavow  your  having  any 
fuch  intentions  by  writing  that  letter,  in  cafe 
you  tinil,  on  your  arrival  in  England,  that 
the  palfagesof  it  (which  I  have  taken  notice 
of)  are  underftood  as  I  fufpedt  they  may  be. 
And  I  therefore  intended  to  have  fent  this 
letter  to  a  friend  to  be  delivered  to  you  in 

London, 


APPENDIX.  8i 

London ;  but  upon  confidering  your  letter  of 
the  2d  inftant,  (which  I  have  had  more  leifure 
to  do  fince  my  public  difpatches  were  clofed) 
I  am  of  opinion,  that  it  is  properer  your  Lord- 
fliip  fliould  receive  my  anfwer  to  it  here. 

"  I  have  the  honour,  &c. 

(%"ed)  «H.  CLINTON." 

"  P.  S.  Having  forgot  to  fpeak  to  the  part 
of  your  Lordfliip's  letter  of  the  2d  inftant, 
where  you  fay,  'I  do  not  recoiled  that  any 
'converfation  palfed  between  us  the  other 
'day,  before  the  publication  of  my  letter, 
'relative  to  my  reafons  for  taking  poifeffion 
'of  the  the  ports  of  York  and  Gloucefter,'  I 
beg  leave  to  do  it  here. 

"It  is  true,  my  Lord,  no  converfation 
parted  from  your  Lordfliip  on  that  fubjedt. 
But  when,  in  the  converfation  alluded  to,  I 
mentioned  that  I  had  dirededyou  to  examine 
Old  Point  Comfort,  and  fortify  it,  but  that, 
difapproving  of  that  pofl,  you  had  feized 
^  York, 


82  APPENDIX. 

York,  and  that  therefore  York  was  your  Lord- 
(hip's  preference ;  as  you  were  pleafed  not  to 
make  me  any  anfwer,  I  took  it  for  granted 

you  agreed  with  me. 

"H.  CLINTON. 

"  Lieutenant-general 

"Earl  Cornwallis." 


NUMBER     IX. 

Extraa  of  a  Letter  from  Sir  Henry  C/ifiton, 
to  Lord  George  Germahie,  dated  December 

"YOUR    Lordfliip  will   have    received 
in  my  Difpatch,  No.  146,  the  copies  of  Lord 
Cornwallis's  letter  to  me  of  the  20th  of  Oc- 
tober, his  capitulation  for  the  ports  of  York 
and  Gloucefter,  and  the  other  papers  which 
accompanied  it.    But  your  Lordlhip  will  per- 
ceive, that  I  declined  making  any  remarks 
'Don  his  letter   until  I   law   his    Lordfliip; 
knowing  that  my  whole  correfpondence  with 
him  being  in  your  Lordfliip's  poiTeflion,  every 

thing 


A  V  P  K  N   I)   1  X, 


83 


thing  which  wanted  explanation  could  readily 
be  cleared  up.  His  Lorddiip  having  arrived 
here  on  the  1 9th  ultimo,  I  have  had  feveral 
converfations  with  him ;  and  I  have  now  the 
honour  to  indole,  for  your  Lordfliip's  infor- 
mation, the  copy  of  a  letter  I  wrote  him  on 
the  fubjedl,  with  his  Lordfhip's  anfwer. 

"I  perceive  b\  Lord  Cornwallis's  letter  of 
the  20th  of  0(it()ber,  that  his  opinion  of  the 
poll:  of  York  is  very  unfivourable;  and  he 
lince  tells  me,  that  he  does  not  think  the 
enemy  will  be  able  to  make  a  llrong  one  of 
it.  Had  his  Lordfliip,  however,  not  been  io 
very  decided  in  his  fentiments  of  the  poll,  all 
the  accounts  I  had  ever  before  received  of 
the  lituation  and  defenlibility  of  the  ground 
would,  I  confefs,  have  inclined  me  to  have 
thought  well  of  it," 


N  U  M- 


«4 


A   I'  P  K  N   D   I   X. 


NUMBER     IX. 

Copy  of  a  Letter  from  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  to 
Lord  George  Germain,  dated  December  6, 
1781. 

/ 

"My  Lord, 

"  I  have  lb  often  had  the  honour  of  deHver- 
ing  the  fame  fentiments  to  your  Lordfliip, 
that  I  muft  beg  your  pardon  for  again  troubHng 
you  with  the  repetition,  that  I  have  ever  been 
of  opinion  that  operation  fliould  not  be  under- 
taken in  the  Chefapeak,  without  having   a 
naval  fuperiority  in   thefe  feas;   and  to   the 
want  of  it,  and  perhaps  to  that  alone,  are  we 
to  impute  our  late  misfortune  in  that  quarter. 
Therefore,  when  I  did  myfelf  the  honour  of 
fending  you  a  copy  of  Lord  Cornwallis's  letter 
to  me  of  the  20th  of  October,  I  did  not  think 
it  neceflary  to  trouble  your  Lordlhip  with  any 
remarks  upon   fome    palfages  of  it,  which 
might  feem  to  imply,  that  his  Lordfliip  had 

been 


to 
6, 


"g 
en 

;r- 

a 

:he 

we 

;er. 

of 

ter 

ink 

my 

ich 

lad 

een 


i 


I 


A  I'  P  E   N   1)  I   X.  85 

been  forced  into  a  bad  port  by  my  orders, 
notwithftanding  he  had  reprefented  its  de- 
fedts,  and  had  been  induced  to  remain  there 
contrary  to  his  judgment  by  the  pofitive  alfu- 
rances  I  had  given  him  of  reUef;  efpecially 
as  your  Lordfliip  was  poirelfed  of  our  cor- 
refpondence,  which  could  in  the  fulleft  man- 
ner invalidate  every  implication  of  that  fort, 
and  I  wiflied  to  have  an  opportunity  of 
fpeaking  to  Lord  Cornwallis  before  I  faid 
any  thing  on  fo  delicate  a  fubjedt. 

"Since  Lord  Cornwallis's  arrival  here,  I 
have  had  a  good  deal  of  converfation  with  his 
Lordfliip  upon  this  bufinefs;  by  which,  and 
by  the  anfwer  he  has  fent  me  to  a  letter  I 
wrote  him  thereon,  (copies  of  which  are  in- 
clofed)  it  appears,  that  his  Lordfliip  admits 
this  was  not  the  cafe.  But  as  Lord  Cornwal- 
lis's difavowal  is  not  fo  explicit  and  dired:  in 
his  letter,  as  I  could  wifli,  and  I  think  juftice 
to  my  charad:er  requires,  I  beg  your  Lord- 
fhip's  attention  to  the  following  obfervations; 

which 


IMAGE  EVALUATION 
TEST  TARGET  (MT-3) 


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I.I 


125 


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FholDgraiM: 

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as  WIST  MAIN  STRUT 

WIMTn,N.Y.  USiO 

(71*)t73-4S01 


^ 


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■  I 


86 


A  P   P   K  N   D   I  X. 


r^ 


which  I  hope  the  anxiety  I  muft  naturally 
feel  on  this  occafion,  will  plead  my  excufe  for 
troubling  you  with ;  though  they  may  not  be 
necelfary  to  vindicate  me  with  your  Lord- 
ihip,  who  is  already  fo  competent  to  judge. 

"I  am  perfuaded  that  it  will  appear  by 
my  letters  to  Lord  Cornwallis  of  the   1 1  th 
and  1 5th  of  June,  and  thofe  referred  to  by 
them,    that    I    recommended    his    taking    a 
healthy,  defenfive  ftation,  either  at  Williamf- 
burg,  or  York ;  and  defired  that,  after  keep- 
ing what  troops  he  might  want  for  its  mofl 
ample  defence  and  defultory  movements  by 
water,  his  Lordfliip  would  fend  me  fuch  a 
proportion  of  the  corps  (mentioned  in  a  lilt) 
as  he  could  fpare,  taking  them  in  the  fuc- 
ceflion  they  are  there  placed.    But  his  Lord- 
fliip,  on    the    contrary,   underftanding    that 
thefe  letters  conveyed  a  pofitive  order  to  fend 
me  three  thoufand  men,  (by  which  he  fays 
his  force  would  have  been  reduced  to  about 

two 


\ 


APPENDIX.  87 

two  thoufand  four  hundred  rank  and  file  fit  for 
duty,  having  probably  at  that  time  a  numerous 
fick)  told  me  in  his  anfwer,  that  he  could 
not,  confiftent  with  my  plans,  make  fafe 
defenfive  pofts  at  York  and  Gloucefter,  (both 
which  would  be  neceflary  for  the  protection 
of  iliipping)  and  that  he  fliould  immediately 
repafs  James  River,  and  take  meafures  for 
complying  with  my  requifition.  Finding, 
therefore,  that  his  Lordfliip  had  fo  entirely 
mifconceived  my  intentions,  I  immediately 
confulted  with  Rear  Admiral  Graves  upon 
the  fubjed:  of  his  letter;  and  the  Admiral 
being  of  opinion  that  a  naval  ftation  in 
Chefapeak  for  large  fliips  was  abfolutely  re- 
quifite,  and  that  Hampton  Road  appeared 
to  be  the  fitteft:  for  the  purpofe,  I  defired 
his  Lordlhip,  at  the  Admiral's  requell,  to  exa- 
mine Old  Point  Comfort  in  the  mouth  of 
James  River,  and  fortify  it,  upon  the  fup- 
pofition  that  a  work  there  would  fecure  that 

harbour ; 


w: 


88  APPENDIX, 

harbour;  and  if  his  Lorddiip  thought  a  poft 
at  York  necelTary  to  cover  Old  Point  Com- 
fort,  he  was  at   liberty   to  take    that    alfo. 
This    order    was   fent    to    Lord    Cornwallis 
in  my  letter  of  the   nth  of  July,  and  his 
Lordfliip's  anfwer  to  it  is  dated  the   27th; 
wherein  he   informs  me,  that  having  exa- 
mined Old  Point  Comfort  with  the   Cap- 
tains of  the  King's  lliips  and  the  engineers, 
and  being  all  of  opinion  a  poft  there  would 
not  anfwer  the  purpofe,  he  fliould,  in  com- 
pliance with  the  fpirit  of  my  orders,  feize 
York  and  Gloucefter,  being  the  only  harbour 
in  which  he  could  hope  to  be  able  to  give 
effeftual  protection  to  line  of  battle  fliips. 
Copies  of  thefe  letters  are  inclofed  for  your 
LordHiip  to  refer  to ;  and  I  truft  it  will  ap- 
pear from  them,  that  the  poft  at  York  was 
in  this  inftance  entirely  his  Lorddiip's  choice. 
But  never  having  received  any  reprefentation 
from  his  Lordftiip,  by  which  I  could  have 

the 


APPENDIX.  8y 

the  lead  conception  he  thought  the  ground 
difadvantageous  and  Hable  to  enfilade,  (as 
ftated  in  his  letter  of  the  20th  of  Odlober) 
and,  fuppofing  from  the  preference  his  Lord- 
fliip  had  thus  given  it  to  the  one  I  had  re- 
commended, that  he  fully  approved  of  York 
and  Gloucefter,  I  own  I  did  not  oppofe  his 
laying  hold  of  them,  as  I  could  not  enter- 
tain the  fmalleft  doubt  of  their  being  defen- 
fible,  and  fuch  a  port  as  I  had  told  his  Lord- 
fliip  I  wanted.  And,  indeed,  if  his  Lord- 
fliip  had  not  now  informed  me  that  it  was  a 
bad  one,  the  eagernefs  with  which  I  under- 
ftand  the  French  have  fince  feized  and  are 
fortifying  it,  would  incline  me  ftill  to  think 
well  of  it. 

"With  refpedt  to  his  Lordlhip  having 
been  influenced  in  his  condudt  by  the  hopes 
of  relief,  (which  he  is  pleafed  to  Hiy  I  uni- 
formly held  out  to  him  in  all  my  letters)  his 
Lordfliip  could  not  be  infenfible  that  the  pof- 
M  fibility 


l!R 


1 

I     *     n 


90  APPENDIX, 

fibility  of  effeaing  it  muft  have  entirely  de- 
pended upon  the  exertions  of  the  fleet,  which, 
as  I  was  not  authorized  to  promife  him  be- 
fore the  council  of  war  held  on  the  24th  of 
September,  I  am  perfuaded  that  the  implica- 
tion in  his  Lordfliip's  letter  that  I  had  done 
fo  before  that  period,  cannot  be  fupported  (as 
indeed  his  Lordfliip  now  feems  to  acknow- 
ledge) by  any  thing  I  wrote  ;o  him,  previous 
to  my  letter  of  that  date,  which  he  received 
on  the   29th.     As,  therefore,  my  letters  of 
the  2d  and  6th  of  September,  which  promife 
only  my  own  exertions,  did  not  reach  his 
Lordfliip  before  the   13th  and  14th  of  that 
month,  and  he  did  not  before  then  know  of 
Sir  S.  Hood's  arrival,  or  that  Admiral  Graves 
had  more  than  feven  tail  of  the  line  to  com- 
bat Monfieur  de  Grafl'e's  force,  whofe  arrival, 
it   appears  from   his   Lordfliip's   letters,  he 
knew  of  on  the  29th  of  Auguft,  and  fuppofed 
it  to  be  twenty-iive  fail  of  the  line,  his  Lord- 
fliip 


APPENDIX. 


9' 


fliip  confequently  did  not  receive  from  me 
any  hopes  of  relief  before  that  time. 

"With  regard  to  his  Lordfliip's  efcape 
to  New  York,  immediately  on  the  arrival 
of  General  Wafliington's  troops  at  Williamf- 
burg,  which  his  letter  of  the  20th  of  0<5tober 
implies  he  was  prevented  from  undertaking 
by  the  receipt  of  mine  of  the  24th  of  Sept. 
I  cannot  help  being  of  opinion,  that  a  re- 
treat, after  Mr.  Wafliington  joined,  was  im- 
practicable, and  that  it  was  at  no  time  to  be 
effedted  to  the  northward,  for  reafons  which 
I  gave  his  Lordfhip.  But  had  it  been  ever 
poffible,  after  the  time  his  Lordfliip  men- 
tions, it  muft,  I  think,  have  been  between 
that  period  and  the  time  of  the  enemy's  force 
prefenting  itfelf  before  the  lines  of  York; 
and  it  is  confequently  prefumable,  his  Lord- 
fhip was  not  prevented  by  any  thing  I  faid 
in  that  letter,  as  he  acknowledges  he  did  not 
receive  it  until  after  the  latter  event  took 
place.     But  I  readily  admit,  my  Lord,  that 

none 


92 


APPENDIX. 


none  of  my  letters  could  give  his  Lordfliip 
the  leaft  realbn  to  fuppofe  that  an  attempt 
would  not  be  made  to  fuccour  him,  though, 
I  muft  confefs,  I  think  his  Lordfliip  fpeaks 
in  his  letter  rather  too  pofitively  of  the  opi- 
nion I  gave  in  mine,  as  to  the  time  of  the 
fleet's  failing.     My  words  being,  'There  is 
'every  reafon   to  hope  we  fliall  ftart  from 
'hence    about   the    5th    of  Odober.'     And 
lefl:   even   that   fliould  be  thought  pofitive, 
I  the  next  day  told  him,  'that  unforefeen 
'  accidents  may  lengthen  it  out  a  day  or  two 
'longer.' 

"The  complaint  his  Lordfliip  makes  of 
the  want  of  intrenching  tools,  I  can  only 
anfwer,  by  faying,  that  it  appears  from  the 
Adjutant-general's  returns  to  me,  that  two 
thoufand  live  hundred  had  been  fent  by  the 
engineer  to  the  Chefapeak  with  the  difl^erent 
expeditions,  fince  the  one  commanded  by 
General  Arnold  inclulive;  and  the  firfl:  mo- 
ment a  reauifition  was  made  for  more  (which 


requi 


was 


A  P  P  E  N  D  I  X. 


93 


t 

.s 

e 
is 
n 
d 

e, 
;n 
ro 

of 

ly 

rie 
^^o 
he 
nt 
by 
o- 
ch 


was  not  before  his  Lordfliip's  letter  of  the 
2  2d  of  Auguft)  I  ordered  an  additional  fup- 
ply  to  be  fent,  which  were  prevented  from 
going  by  the  arrival  of  the  French  fleet. 
But  I  muft  own,  my  Lord,  that  I  was  not 
then  very  uneafy  on  this  fcore,  as  I  flattered 
myfelf  it  was  poflible  for  his  Lordfliip  to 
have  collected  what  he  wanted  from  the 
neighbouring  plantations  any  time  before  the 
inveftiture  was  begun. 

"  No  man,  my  Lord,  can  feel  more  fenfibly 
than  I  did  for  the  unhappy  fituation  of  Lord 
Cornwallis  and  his  gallant  army,  whofe  me- 
ritorious condudt,  fpirit,  and  zeal,  on  all  oc- 
calions,  muft  heighten  our  anxiety  and  con- 
cern for  their  prefent  fate;  and  therefore  as 
his  Lordfliip  is  pleafed  to  tell  me  that  his 
letter  of  the  20th  of  Odtober  was  written 
under  great  agitation  of  mind  and  in  great 
hurry,  which  might  poflibly  have  prevented 
his  adverting  to  the  implications  which  it 
may  be  thought  to  bear,  I  cannot,  at  prefent, 

wifli 


i'S 


94 


A  P  P  K  N   D  I  X. 


wifli  to  give  his  Lordfliip  more  trouble  on 
the  fubjea:,  although  his  anfwer  of  the  2d 
inftant  is  not  fo  explicitly  fatisfaftory  as  I 
expeded  it  would  have  been;    for,   if  the 
paflages  in  that  letter,  which  I  have  taken 
notice  of,  fliould  be  underftood  in  Europe  in 
any  refpeft  to  my  prejudice,  I  cannot  doubt 
his  Lordfliip  will  have  candour  enough  moft 
formally  to  difavow  his  having  any  fuch  in- 
tentions.    But  if  his  Lordfliip,  contrary  to 
my  expedation,  fliall  not  be  inclined  to  do 
fo,  I  mufl  be  obliged,  though  reludantly, 
moft  earneftly  to  requeft  your  Lordfliip  to 
render  me  that  juftice,  (which  I  am  perfuaded 
you  think  I  deferve)  by  publifliing  this  letter. 

"  I  have  the  honour,  &c. 

"H.  CLINTON." 


NUM- 


\ 

i 


1 

d 
I 

e 
n 
n 
)t 
ft 
i- 
:o 
lo 

to 

:d 

:r. 


APPENDIX. 


NUMBER     X. 


95 


Extra6i  from  Sir  H.  Clinton's  Injirtiiiions  to 
Major-General  Philips ^  dated  March  lo, 
1781. 

"IF  the  Admiral  difapproving  of  Portf- 
mouth,  and  requiring  a  fortified  ftation  for 
large  ihips  in  the  Chefapeak,  fliould  propofe 
York  Town,  or  Old  Point  Comfort,  if  pof- 
feffion  of  either  can  be  acquired  and  main- 
tained without  great  rifk  or  lofs,  you  are  at 
liberty  to  take  polTeffion  thereof.  But  if  the 
objed:ions  are  fuch  as  you  think  forcible,  you 
muft,  after  ftating  thofe  objedtions,  decline  it 
till  folid  operations  take  place  in  the  Chefa- 
peak." 


Extract 


96 


APPENDIX. 


ExtraB  from  the  Suhjhince  of  Converfations 
held  ivith  General  Philips,  fent  to  that 
General  Officer  for  his  Guidance. 

"  BUT  if  the  heights  of  York,  and  thofe 
on  the  Gloucefter  fide,  cannot  be  fo  well  and 
fo  foon  fortified  as  to  render  that  port  hors 
d'infiilt  before  the  enemy  can  move  a  force, 
&c.  againft  it,  it  may  not  be  advifeable  to 
attempt  it.    In  that  cafe  fomething  may  pof- 
fibly  be  done  at  Old  Point  Comfort  to  cover 
large  fliips  lying  in  Hampton  road,  which  is 
reckoned  a  good  one.     If  neither  can  be  fe- 
cured,  we  muft  content  ourfelves  with  keep- 
ing the  Chefapeak,  with  frigates  and  other 
armed  vefl'els,  which  will  always  find  fecurity 
againft  a  fuperior  naval  force  in  Elizabeth 
River." 


N  U  M- 


APPENDIX. 


97 


NUMBER    XI.     Vide  p.  7.  1.  15. 

Extras  from   Sir  Henry  Clintotis  Letters  to 
Lord  George  Germain. 

OCTOBER  30,  1780.  "I  fliall  in  a  few 
days  fend  to  Charles-town,  all  the  recruits 
belonging  to  the  fouthern  army,  which  will 
be  about  eight  hundred.  And  then,  includ- 
ing the  corps  under  General  Leflie,  Lord 
Cornwallis  will  have  full  11 306  effedtive 
rank  and  file  under  his  orders. 

April  5th,  1 78 1.  "After  the  redudion 
of  Charles-town,  Lord  Cornwallis  informed 
me,  that  he  thought  the  force  I  left  with  him 
fully  competent  to  the  defence  of  South,  and 
moft  probably  the  redu(ftion  of  North  Caro- 
lina. I  had,  therefore,  at  that  time  no  other 
intention  (threatened  as  we  were,  by  the  ex- 
pected arrival  of  a  French  fleet  and  army  in 
Rhode-Ifland)  than  to  fend  an  expedition 
into  Chefapeak,  merely  by  way  of  making  a 
N  diverfion 


l§r 


i'i 


98  APPENDIX, 

diverfion  in  his  Lorddiip's  favour,  until  more 
folid  operation  might  take  place.     Which  I 
was  in  hopes  that  adequate  reinforcements 
from  Europe,  would  have  enabled  me  to  un- 
dertake early  in  the  prefent  year.     Events, 
however,  notwithftanding  the  very  glorious 
exertions  which  were  made  at  Camden,  al- 
tered Lord  Cornwallis's  fituation  fo  much  as 
to  make  it  necellary  for  him  to  call  the  corps 
I  had  fent  to  Chefapeak  with  General  Leilie, 
(and  which  I  had  put  under  his  Lorddiip's 
orders)    to    a    nearer    co-operation.      Being, 
therefore,  ftill  defirous  to  fecure  a  port  in 
that  bay  to  cover  the  King's  frigates  which 
might  be  ading  there;  and  at  the  fame  time 
wifliing  to  give  Lord  Cornwallis  every  afllft- 
ance  in  my  power;  I  fent  thither  another 
detachment,  under  the  orders  of  Brigadier- 
general  Arnold ;  which,  though  not  fo  con- 
fiderable  as  the  former  met  with  the  fulleft 
fuccefs,  and  will,  I  doubt  not,  have  greatly 
aided  the  movements  of  the  army  in  Caro- 
lina. 


1 


1 


A  P  P  K  N   1)  1  X.  99 

Hna.     General  Wafliington  having  detached 
a  hody  of  troops  to  the  fouthward,  and  the 
French  having  embarked  in  their  Heet,  ano- 
ther from  their  army  at  Rhode-illand,  with 
an    apparent   intention   of  interrupting   our 
operations    in   Virginia,  and  the  Carolinas; 
I  was  induced  to  fend  to  the  Chefapeak  ano- 
ther expedition  (drawn  principally  from  the 
elite  of  my  army)  under  Major-general  Phil- 
lips.     All   thefe  feveral    detachments,  your 
Lordfliip  will  perceive  are  adling,  either  with 
or  in  favour  of  Lord  Cornwallis.     But,  as 
General  Wafliington's  letter  to  Mr.  Harrison 
(a  copy  of  which   your   Lordlhip  will  fee 
amongft  the  intercepted  letters  inclofed)  inti- 
mates, that  there  will  not  be  oppofed  to  his 
Lordfliip,  above   two  thoulimd  continentals 
more  than  General  Green  had  with  him  be- 
fore;   I    am    led    to   hope    that,    when    his 
Lordfliip  has  eftablished  himfelf  in  North- 
Carolina,  a  very  confiderable  portion  of  his 
army  may  be  fpared  to  affift  in  carrying  into 

execution 


loo  A  P  P  K  N   D  1  X. 

execution  fuch  further  operations,  as  Lord 
Cornwallis  may  have  to  propofe;  or  the 
whole  or  fuch  part  as  (hall  be  found  pradi- 
cable  of  thofe  I  had  defigned,  and  accordingly 
explained  to  Major-general  Phillips,  in  fome 
converfations  I  had  with  him  before  his  de- 
parture. 

« If  an  attempt  upon  the  forts  in  the  high 
lands  fhall  not,  on  mature  deliberation,  be 
thought  advifeable,and  nothing  elfe  offers  in 
this  quarter;  I  fhall  probably  reinforce  Ma- 
jor-general Phillips,  and  dire<a  him  to  carry 
on  fuch  operations  as  may  moft  effeftually 
favour  thofe  of  Lord  Cornwallis,  until  fome 
plan  can  be  determined  on  for  the  campaign. 
For,  until  I  know  his  LordHiip's  fuccefs,  the 
force  he  can,  in  confequence  of  it,  fpare  from 
the  Carolinas,  and  the  certainty  of  the  arrival 
of  the  fix  regiments  intended  to  reinforce  us, 
it  will  be  impoflible  to  decide  finally  upon  it. 
Your  Lordfliip  will,  however,  fee  by  the  in- 
clofed  opinions,  what  were  the  operations  I 

had 


A  F  P  K  N   D  I  X. 


lOI 


3rd 
the 
fti- 

gV 
ime 

de- 

ligh 
.  be 
•s  in 
Ma- 
arry 
lally 
bme 
lign. 
,  the 
from 
rival 
:e  us, 
on  it. 
e  in- 
ons  I 
had 


had  planned  for  the  enfuing  campaign,  upon 
the  fuppofition,  that  Lord  Cornwallis  fuc- 
ceeded  in  the  Carolinas,  and  was  able  to 
fpare  a  confiderable  force  from  thence.  With 
the  ten  thoufand  men  I  requefted,  I  fliould  not 
have  had  a  doubt  of  fuccefs.  But  in  my 
prefent  reduced  ftate  and  profpedts  I  dare  not 
flatter  myfelf  with  any.  And  if  the  French 
(hould  ftill  be  reinforced,  your  Lordfliip  will, 
I  am  perfuaded,  judge  our  fituation  to  be 
even  critical.  For  with  regard  to  our  efforts 
in  the  Chefapeak,  your  Lordfliip  knows 
how  much  their  fuccefs  and  even  the  fafety 
of  the  armament  there,  will  depend  upon  our 
having  a  decided  naval  fuperiority  in  thefe 
feas.  And  I,  therefore,  cannot  doubt  that 
every  precaution  will  be  taken,  to  give  me, 
at  leaft,  timely  notice  of  the  contrary  being 
likely  to  happen ;  as  my  ignorance  of  fuch 
an  event,  might  be  moft  fatal  in  its  confe- 

quences. 

The 


''I 
Ji' 

111:' 


102  APPENDIX. 

"The    reinforcement    I     afked    for,    was 
only  what  I  judged  to  be  barely  adequate 
to  the  fervices  required;  and  I  moft  sincerely 
wirti  it  had  been  poflible  to  have  fent  it  in 
the  full  extent  of  numbers,  and  in  the  time 
I  requefted.     However,  the  prefent  reduced 
ftate  of  General  Wafliington,  the  little  proba- 
bility there  is,  I  hope,  of  an  augmentation  to 
the    French    armament,    and   the    certainty 
there  is,  I  likewife  hope,  of  the  fix  Britifli 
regiments,  and  one  thoufand  recruits  joining 
me  in  a  fliort  time,  together,  with  the  ex- 
pectation I  have  of  Lord  Cornwallis's  fuccefs 
in  Carolina,  enabling  him  to  fend  me  a  con- 
fiderable  reinforcement  from  thence,  render 
the  appearances  of  my  fituation  lefs  critical. 
And  I  fliall,  therefore,  only  add,  my  Lord, 
that  while  the  King  does  me  the  honour,  to 
truft  me  with  the  command  of  this  army, 
I  will  employ  it  to  the  utmoft:  of  my  poor 
abilities,   for   the    promoting   his   fervice; — 
taking  the  liberty,  however,  to  reprefent  (as 

I  think 


I 


APPENDIX.  103 

I  think  it  my  duty)  what  advantages  may 
be  obtained  by  an  additional  force,  and  what 
evils  may  be  apprehended  from  the  want  of 
a  fufficient  one. 

April  30,  1 78 1.  "Your  Lordfliip  will 
have  feen  in  the  paper  I  had  the  honour  to 
fend  you  in  my  laft  difpatch,  what  force  I 
judged  would  be  requifite  for  this  fervice. 
Not  lefs,  my  Lord,  than  10,000  men  rank 
and  file,  fit  for  duty,  indeed  I  wifli  they 
could  be  more.  But  the  inclofed  returns 
will  fliew  your  Lordfliip  that  after  leaving 
thefe  ports  to  their  prefent  garrifons,  and 
leaving  1000  men  in  the  poft  in  Elizabeth 
River  (fuppofing  it  may  not  be  found  ne- 
ceffary  to  occupy  another  flation)  I  fliall  not 
have  quite  5000  men  for  it,  unless  the  three 
battalions  expected  from  the  Weft  Indies 
arrive  in  proper  time  and  condition  for  fer- 
vice, or  Lord  Cornwallis  fliould  be  able 
to  fpare  from  his  defenfive  in  Carolina  (when 
he  determines  upon  it)  a  confiderable  part  of 

the 


mmm^ 


104 


APPENDIX. 


the  army  under  his  immediate  command; 
which,  however,  his  Lordfliip's  letter  of  the 
loth  inftant,  gives  me  no  hopes  of,  or  indeed 
that  he  will  even  fpare  me  the  three  regi- 
ments coming  from  Ireland. 

"With   thefe   5000,   however,  my   Lord, 
I   may  poffibly  determine  to  rifk,  even  by 
defultory  movements,  the  trial  of  this  experi- 
ment, fliould  I  find,  the  report  given  me  of 
our  friends  in  that  country  properly  founded. 
If  it  fucceeds  as  fully  as  our  fanguine  friends 
would  perfuade  us  to  hope,  we  may  poffibly 
be  able  to  maintain  ourfelves  there  with  a 
fmall  force ;  but  if  we  are  in  a  fituation  to 
give  the  experiment  a  fair  trial,  and  it  then 
fails,  I  fliall,  I  confefs,  have  little  hopes  after- 
wards of  re-eftablifliing  order  on  this  conti- 
nent ;  which  I  am  free  to  own  I  think  can 
never  be  effeded  without  the  ccrdial  affift- 
ance  of  numerous  friends,  &c, 

[Inclojed 


APPENDIX. 


105 


n 


'd 


Inclofed  in  the  above  letter  the  following 
extraBs  from  Sir  Henry  Clinton's  letters  to 
Major  General  Phillips. 

April  26,  1781. 

"  Lord  Cornwallis's  arrival  at  Wilmington 
has  confiderably  changed  the  complexion  of 
our  affairs  to  the  fouthward;  and  all  ope- 
rations to  the  northward  muft  probably  give 
place  to  thofe  in  favour  of  his  Lordfliip, 
which  at  prefent  appear  to  require  our  more 
immediate  attention.  I  know  nothing  of  his 
Lordlhip's  lituation,  but  what  I  have  learnt 
from  his  letter  to  me  of  the  i  oth,  which  you 
have  read.  I  had  great  hopes,  before  I  re- 
ceived this  letter  that  his  Lordfliip  would 
have  been  in  a  condition  to  fpare  me  a  conlide- 
rable  part  of  his  army  from  Carolina  for  the 
operations  in  Chefapeak ;  but  you  will  obferve 
from  it,  that  inftead  of  fending  any  part  of  his 
prefent  force  thither,  he  propofes  to  detain 
a  part  of  the  reinforcement  coming  from  Eu- 
rope for  his  more  fouthern  operations,  even 
o  though 


■«!'  ■"" 


I 


,06               APPENDIX, 
though   they   fliould  be   defenfive.     I    Ihall 
therefore  take  the  opinions  of  the  general  of- 
ficers near  me,  upon  the  prefent  ftate  of  our 
affairs,  and  afterwards  fend  you  fuch  a  rein- 
forcement from  this  army,  as  we  may  judge 
can  be  done  with  tolerable  fecurity  to  this 
poft,  at  leaft,  while  we  remain  fuperior  at  fea. 
April  30,  1781.    To  the  fame.    "If  Lord 
Cornwallis  propofes  no  operation  to  you  foon 
(that  is,  before  the  month  of  June)  and  you 
fee  none  that  will  operate  for  him  direBly.    I 
think  the  beft  indireSi  one  in  his  favour  will 
be  what  you  and  General  Arnold  have  pro- 
pofed  to  me  in  Number  10  of  your  joint  letter 
of  the  1 8th  inftant.    The  only  ride  you  run  is 
from  a  temporary  fuperiority  of  the  enemy  at 
fea ;  it  is,  however,  an  important  move,  and 
ought,  in  my  opinion,  to  be  tried  even  with 
fome  rifle.     Give  me  timely  information  of 
your  intended  move,  and  if  poffible  I  will  fol- 
low you  into with  fuch  a  fmall  rein- 


forcement as  I  can  at  the  time  fpare. 


"If 


A  P  l»  K  N   I)  1  X. 


107 


11 

f- 
ir 
1- 


?e 


ns 

:a. 
rd 
on 
ou 
I 
/ill 
ro- 
:ter 
n  is 
^  at 
and 
nth 
n  of 
fol- 
ein- 

"If 


"  If  the  next  packet  does  not  fatisfy  me  in 

I  fliall  probably  retire  and  leave  the 

command  to  Lord  Cornwallis;  to  whom  it 
will  be  my  advice  to  try  the  only  experiment 
that  in  my  opinion  can  operate,  if  the  one  in 
Carolina  has  failed.  For  as  to  Virginia,  I 
know  none  which  can  reduce  that  province 
in  one  campaign. 

"As  you  feemed  to  think,  before  you  re- 
ceived Lord  Cornwallis's  letter  that  all  dired: 
operation  in  favour  of  his  Lordfliip  would 
ceafe  by  the  end  of  May,  &c.  pray  let  me 
receive  General  Arnold's,  and  your  opinion 
as  foon  as  poffible;  I  confefs,  I  am  not  fan- 
guine,  but  if  the  experiment  can  be  tried  with- 
out any  other  rifk  than  from  the  enemy's  fu- 
periority  at  fea  I  fhould  wifli  to  do  it. 

"Should  Lord  Cornwallis  determine  on  a 
defenfive  in  the  Carolinas,  he  furely  cannot 
want  any  of  the  European  reinforcement,  and 
will  of  courfe,  fend  it  to  you,  and  all  fuch 
other  as  fliall  arrive ;  thus  reinforced,  if  after 

leaving 


,o8                A  V  P  K  N   D  1  X. 
leaving  a  fufficient  garrifon  in  Elizabeth  Ri- 
ver, you  can  proceed  to I  think  we  fliall 

be  in  force  to  give  this  a  fair  trial;  and  I 
may  leave  you  in  the  command  there,  unlefs 
things  fliould  take  a  more  favourable  turn  in 
the  Carolinas,  and  Lord  Cornwallis's  prefence 
there  be  no  longer  neceffary.  For  until  they 
do,  I  fliould  imagine  he  v^^ill  not  quit  them. 

N.  B.  Thefe  two  letters  with  other  dif- 
patches  fell  into  Lord  Cornwallis's  hands  on 
General  Phillips's  death  and  were  opened  by 
his  Lordfliip;  and  the  expedition  therein 
propofed  recommended  to  his  confideration. 


N  U  M- 


A  P  1'  K  N   1)  1  X. 


109 


li- 
all 
I  I 
efs 
in 
ice 
ley 
m. 

iif- 

on 

by 

•ein 

on. 


M- 


NUMBER    XII.     Vide  p.  37.  1.  6. 

Ext ra^s from  Sir  Hctiry  Clintons  Letters  to 
Lord  George  Germain. 

May  20,  1 78 1. 

"BUT  fliould  Lord  Cornwallis  perfift  in 
his  intention  of  joining  Major-general  Phil- 
lips, as  mentioned  in  his  letter  to  that  General 
Officer,  I  fliall  be  under  fome  apprehenfions 
for  every  part  of  South  Carolina,  except 
Charles-town,  and  even  for  Georgia,  unlefs 
the  fpeedy  arrival  of  the  reinforcement  ex- 
peded  from  Europe,  may  enable  the  officer, 
commanding  in  South  Carolina,  to  take  port 
in  force  in  fome  healthy  ftation  in  the  back 
country. 

"May  22.  Notw^ithftanding  the  purport 
of  thefe  letters,  I  am  yet  in  hopes,  from  Lord 
Cornwallis's  letter  to  me  of  the  24th,  that 
his  Lordfliip  will  not  perlill  in  attempting 
a  jundion  with  Major-general  Phillips,  as  I 

am 


no  A  V  V  E  N  I)  I  X. 

am  apprehenfive  it  may  be  attended  with  Ibme 
rifle,  not  only  to  his  own  corps,  but  to  that 
of  General  Phillips,  fliould  that  General  Of- 
ficer not  have  been  joined  in  time  by  the  re- 
inforcement I  have  fent  him.     And  I  even 
have  my  doubts  whether  his  Lordrtiip's  march 
to  the  northward  will  draw  after  him,  as  he 
expefts,  the   rebel   General  Green;   who,  I 
fear,  will  endeavour  either  to  invert  Camden, 
or,  by  ftationing  himfelf  between  that  place 
and  Charleftown,  render  Lord  Rawdon's  fitu- 
ation  very  hazardous.    I  am  therefore  induced 
to  flatter  myfelf,  that  Lord  Cornwallis,  when 
he  hears  of  Lord  Rawdon's  fuccefs  againfl: 
Green,  will  rather  march  into  South  Carolina 
either  by  the  diredl  route  of  Crofs  Creek  and 
Camden,  or  by  that  of  George  Town ;  or  even 
by  embarkation,  though  he  (hould  be  obliged 
to  leave  his  cavalry  behind  until  vefl*els  can  be 
fent  for  them,  than  attempt  the  propofed  junc- 
tion with  General  Phillips  in  the  way  he  men- 
tions; 


APPENDIX.  , , , 

tions;  which  I  mufl  freely  own  appears  to 
me,  for  the  reafons  I  have  ftated,  not  only 
dangerous  to  both  corps  in  the  attempt,  but 
replete  with  the  worft  confequences  to  our 
fouthern  Provinces  in  their  prefent  date." 


I 


NUMBER    XIII.     Vide  p.  37.  1.  ,,. 

Extrci£is  from  Sir  Henry  Cl'mtotCs  Letters  to 
Lord  George  Germain. 

July  18,  1 78 1.  "The  extracts  from  my 
correfpondence  with  Earl  Cornwallis,  which 
I  have  had  the  honour  to  tranfmit  from  time 
to  time  to  your  Lordfliip,  will  fhew,  that  I 
left  in  Carolina  a  very  fair  proportion  of  my 
army,  and  fuch  as  his  Lordfliip  thought  fuf- 
ficient  to  fecure  South,  and  recover  ^orth 
Carolina.  With  what  was  left  for  me  to 
adt  with  in  this  quarter,  I  took  the  field 
immediately  upon  my  arrival  here.    General 


Leil 


le  s 


I  12 


APPENDIX. 

Leflie's  expedition   to   the   Chefapeak   took 
place     afterwards;    and    fome    unfortunate 
events  in   Carolina   calling  for  ftill  farther 
reinforcement    and    co-operation,    foon    re- 
duced this  part  of  my  army  to  a  defenfive, 
almoft  as  low  in  numbers  as  Sir  William 
Howe  left   me  in   1777.      If  our  fuccefles, 
therefore,   in   the   fouthern    Provinces    have 
not  anfwered  your  Lordfliip's  expedations, 
it  cannot,  I  am  certain,  be  imputed  either 
to  the  fmallnefs  of  the  numbers  I  left  there, 
or  the  tardinefs  or  fcantinefs  with  which  I 
have  fmce   fupplied   the  exigencies  of  that 
fervice.     Though  I   am   ftrongly  imprelfed 
with  the  importance  of  recovering  Virginia, 
I  fear  the  entire  redudion  of  fo  populous 
a  province   is   not  to  be  expeded  from   an 
operation  folely  there;  unlefs  our  friends  in 
it  were  more  numerous,  and  were  heartily 
inclined  to  affift  us  not  only  in  conquering, 
but  in  keeping  it. 


ok 
ate 
ler 
re- 
ve, 
am 
res, 
ave 
)ns, 
her 
2re, 
\i  I 
hat 
ired 
nia, 
lous 
an 
)  in 
tily 

fuly 


APPENDIX.  ,,3 

July  25.     "No  man,  my  Lord,  laments 
more  fincerely  than  I  do,  the  long  continuance 
of  the  wefterly  winds,  which  prevented  the 
faiUng  of  the  Warwick's  convoy;  and  I  hope 
your  Lordniip  will  pardon  me  for  again  re- 
peating, that  had  the  reinforcement  failed  as 
early  as  was  promifed,  and  the  three  battalions 
not  been  detained  in  the  Weft  Indies,  I  fliould 
perhaps  by  this  time  have  made  fuch  move- 
ments as  would  have  obliged  the  enemy  to 
be  apprehenfive  for  their  own  polTeffions,  in- 
ftead  of  meditating  the  attack  which  they 
now  threaten  againft  this  port." 

Auguft  9.  « I  am  entirely  of  your  Lord- 
fliip's  fentiments  with  refped:  to  Lord  Corn- 
wallis  having  done  as  much  in  North  Caro- 
lina as  could  have  been  effedled  with  his 
force.  But  I  have  to  lament  the  caufes 
which  reduced  it  fo  low  in  number;  and 
that  his  Lordfhip  was  induced  to  perfift  in 
his  plan,  after  it  became  obvious  that  he  was 
'^  not 


i  ' 


,14  APPENDIX. 

not  able  to  eftablifli  himfelf  there,  and  fup- 
port  and  arm  the  Loyalifts,  which  were  the 
objefts  of  his  march  into  the  heart  of  that 

province." 

From  Lord  CornwalHs's  former  letters,  I 
had  every  reafon  to  fuppofe  he  thought  him- 
felf in  fufficient  ftrength   to  command  the 
fuccefs  he   hoped  for.     Had  his   Lordlhip, 
however,  upon  Lieutenant-colonel  Tarleton's 
miffortune,  called  upon  me  for  a  reinforce- 
ment, or  had  I  even  known  it  in  time,  I  am 
perfuaded  your    Lordfhip  will    do  me    the 
juftice  to  acknowledge,  that  it  was  abfolutely 
out  of  my  power  to  aflifl:  him  more  than  I 
did ;  efpecially  when  it  is  confidered,  that  at 
this  moment  his  Lordfliip  has  ading  with 
him,  and   in   the  different  polls   under  his 
command,  nineteen  Britifli,  eight  German, 
and  fourteen    Provincial    battalions,   befides 
detachments    from    four    Britifli    battalions, 
and  lagers,  artillery  and  cavalry;  whilft  in 
my    prefent    threatened    fituation,     I    have 

(through 


APPENDIX.  115 

(through  my  earneft  defire  to  fupport  his 
operations)  left  myfelf  only  eight  Britifli, 
eleven  German,  and  four  Provincial  bat- 
talions, befides  artillery  and  cavalry,  for  thofe 
in  this  quarter. 


The     end. 


